Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 13
Issue 2 (Winter 2019)

Article 1

February 2019

Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy Volume 13, Issue 2 (Winter
2019)

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp
Part of the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
(2019) "Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy Volume 13, Issue 2 (Winter 2019)," Tennessee Journal of
Law and Policy: Vol. 13 : Iss. 2 , Article 1.
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol13/iss2/1

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL
Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been
accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information,
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp.

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

The TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY is
published semi-annually and edited by students of The
University of Tennessee College of Law. The publisher is
the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, 1505 West
Cumberland Avenue, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-1810.
The subscription rate is $24.00 per volume or $12.00 per
single issue. Unless notice to the contrary is received, the
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY assumes that
a renewal of the subscription is desired. All claims of
non-receipt of an issue should be made within six months
of date of publication if claimant wishes to avoid paying
for the missing issue. To order back issues, contact
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. at 1285 Main Street, Buffalo,
New York 14209-1987, or call toll free at (800) 828-7571.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to TENNESSEE
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, 1505 West Cumberland
Avenue, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-1810.
Copyright © 2019, TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND
POLICY, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
All Rights Reserved.
ISSN 1940-4131
http://www.tennesseelawandpolicy.org

[429]
1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE COLLEGE OF LAW
ADMINISTRATION
MELANIE D. WILSON
Dean of the College of Law
Lindsay Young Distinguished Professor of Law
PAULA SCHAEFER
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Professor of Law
KATRICE W. JONES MORGAN
Assistant Dean for Student Affairs
PENNY J. WHITE
Director of the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution

Elvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law
THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
ADMINISTRATION
WAYNE DAVIS
Interim Chancellor
DAVID MANDERSCHEID
Provost
Senior Vice Chancellor

[430]
2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2
2018–2019 EDITORIAL STAFF
EDITORIAL BOARD
ANDREW SCHRACK
Editor in Chief

BRIAN WILSON
Managing Editor

TYLER SIMS
Executive Editor

MATTHEW SHARP
Publications Editor

CADEE CODY
Articles Editor

HAYDEN SHORT
Articles Editor

CHRIS DUNBAR
Research Editor

MATTHEW HUFFER
Research Editor

KAMERON DAWSON
Candidacy Process Editor
EDITORS
HEATHER BOSAU
PEYTON CARR
TYLER CORCORAN
COLLEEN FOLEY
JAMIE GLASS

TRENT KINKAID
NICHOLAS NESTER
LYNN RYAN
JEN SVILAR

FACULTY ADVISOR
BRADLEY A. AREHEART
Associate Professor of Law

[431]
3

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

[432]
4

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

CONTENTS
ARTICLES
TEACHING TO THE TEST: DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE
TEST FOR FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO “NO
PROMO HOMO” EDUCATION POLICIES
Kameron Dawson
435

PLEADING GUILTY: INDIGENT DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF
THE PLEA PROCESS
Jeanette Hussemann
Jonah Siegel

459

TENNESSEE’S
NATIONAL
IMPACT
ON
TEACHER
EVALUATION LAW & POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT OF VALUEADDED MODEL LITIGATION
Mark A. Paige
Audrey Amrein-Beardsley
Kevin Close
523

Publication of contributions does not signify adoption of the views
expressed therein by the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, its
editors, faculty advisors, or The University of Tennessee.

[433]
5

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

[434]
6

TENNESSEE JOURNAL
OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13

WINTER 2019

ISSUE 2

ARTICLE

TEACHING TO THE TEST
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO “NO
PROMO HOMO” EDUCATION POLICIES
Kameron Dawson*
Abstract
Under the current tests set out in Pickering and its
progeny, teachers—particularly LGBT and LGBT allies—
are being censored in the classroom with “no promo homo”
education policies and laws. Although citizens are
granted free speech protections through the First
Amendment, public employees such as public school
teachers generally receive less protection. The Supreme
Court has yet to determine a distinct test for public school
teachers, leaving discretion to school districts. Currently,
in seven states, legislators explicitly prohibit teachers
from positively speaking about or
correcting
misconceptions on homosexuality. In this current age,
these policies negatively impact the teacher’s effectiveness
inside of the classroom by distributing sometimes false or
J.D. Candidate, May 2019, The University of Tennessee
College of Law; A.B. Political Science; A.B.J. Mass Media Arts,
University of Georgia.
*

[435]
7

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

misleading information and contributing to a hostile
environment for both teachers and students. This article
suggests one standard that accounts for the new
recognition of same-sex rights as a matter of public policy
and prohibits viewpoint discrimination.
I. Introduction
436
II. “No Promo Homo” Laws and their Effects on
Schools
439
III. The Potential Legal Tests That Apply to “No Promo
Homo” Laws
442
A. Connick and Pickering
442
B. Garcetti
446
C. Tinker
448
IV. Analysis of “No Promo Homo” Laws Under Each
Test
450
A. Connick and Pickering
450
B. Garcetti
453
C. Tinker
455
V. Conclusion
457
I. Introduction
Currently, seven states have enacted “no promo
homo” laws that restrict any school-based instruction or
activity that could be interpreted as pro-homosexuality.1
Some of these laws prohibit teachers from positively
acknowledging homosexuality by stressing that
“homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general
public.”2 Others limit teachings of homosexuality as
source material for AIDs prevention or unhealthy sexual
habits.3 In doing so, schools relegate homosexuality to a
“No Promo Homo” Laws, GLSEN, https://www.glsen.org/
learn/policy/issues/nopromohomo [https://perma.cc/3LG2-TMFH].
2 ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2 (2018).
3 Id.
1
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taboo status. These policies are a matter of strong
concern for LGBT supporters and families. Many
teachers feel compelled to teach material that contradicts
their beliefs and identities.
“No promo homo” policies were initially created to
supplement sexual health education in prevention of
AIDs. Many of the laws were created in the late ‘80s or
‘90s, yet have not been updated to match the
technological advancements and legal decisions in light
of Obergefell and Lawrence.4 Texas’s policy teaches “that
homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the general
public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal offense
under Section 21.06, Penal Code.”5 In Lawrence v. Texas,
the Supreme Court held criminalizing homosexuality
under Section 21.06 unconstitutional.6 Other states
demean homosexuality as a means to prevent contraction
of AIDS. However, these practices invoke a fallacy and
stigma within students. The curriculum negates the fact
that heterosexual individuals may also contract AIDS
and, generally, LGBT individuals will not all contract the
disease. “No promo homo” laws should be repealed
because they teach students outdated curriculum and
instigate unconstitutional practices.
“No promo homo” laws also raise serious First
Amendment concerns for teachers and students alike.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.”7 As a matter of policy, courts defer to
school districts to have broad authority in writing
curriculum and encouraging social norms unless there is
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716 (2018); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 11-103.3 (West 2018); ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2
(2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-171 (West 2016); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-32-30 (2016); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 163.002 (West 2017).
6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
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a lack of sufficient justification for the restriction.8 The
Supreme Court has recognized students’ right to receive
ideas and has barred explicit regulations—such as
removing books from the school’s library—that constitute
viewpoint
discrimination
without
legitimate
justification.9 “No promo homo” laws violate both teacher
and students’ rights, but this article will discuss the
ramifications for teachers.
Unfortunately, the Court has not clearly
designated protection for teacher speech discussing
sexual orientation in schools. School districts reason that
allowing teachers to discuss homosexuality in a positive
light is inappropriate because it will encourage students
to become gay and disrupt school operations. This
justification is insufficient because recent data has
shown that “no promo homo” laws create an environment
of intolerance that causes disorder in school. The harmful
effects of “no promo homo” laws on all aspects of school
operations reveal the necessity for a clear test to
determine teachers’ First Amendment rights. It is
unclear as to whether teacher speech regarding this topic
is subjected to analysis under Connick-Pickering,
Garcetti, or Tinker. Part II of this article will discuss the
three tests. Part III will analyze the facts under each test
and predict the likely outcome of LGBT teachers’ claims.
Finally, Part IV will conclude with the appropriate test
for these claims.

See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir.
2010); Ronny Hamed-Troyansky, Erasing “Gay” From The
Blackboard: The Unconstitutionality of “No Promo Homo”
Education Laws, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 85, 92–94
(2016).
9 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
8
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II. “No Promo Homo” Laws and their Effects on
Schools
Anti-gay education policies facilitate an intolerant
culture by barring teachers from speaking positively of
homosexuality. In 2015, a national survey from GLSEN,
an organization dedicated to facilitating safe school
environments for all students, reported that “57.6% of
LGBTQ students felt unsafe at school because of their
sexual orientation, and 43.3% because of their gender
expression.”10 Students turn to staff for counseling and
guidance to rectify their situations. However, the report
also stated that “63.5% of the students who did report an
incident said that school staff did nothing in response or
told the student to ignore it.”11 “No promo homo” laws
exacerbate these problems by creating a hostile
environment for students. When students attempt to
report harassment, teachers are prohibited from acting
in a way that advocates for LGBT students.
“No promo homo” laws leave teachers feeling
helpless and unable to do their job effectively. Some
teachers refuse to mention homosexuality altogether.
This leaves LGBT supporters paralyzed to effectively
facilitate productive conversations that promote a more
tolerant student body. Kimberlee Irvine, an 8th grade
teacher, described an instance in 2013 where “her class
was discussing a passage in which a character has two
dads.”12 One student thought that this was a typo which
created a moment that sidetracked the lesson. The
JOSEPH G. KOSCIW ET AL., GLSEN, THE 2015 NATIONAL
SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S
SCHOOLS xvi (2015).
11 Id.
12 Corinne Segal, Eight States Censor LGBTQ Topics in School.
Now, A Lawsuit Is Challenging That, PBS NEWS HOUR (Jan.
29, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/lgbtq-issuesclass-lawsuit-utah [https://perma.cc/D8GB-GARW].
10
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teacher noted that “if I could just answer this, it would
create understanding.”13 Fast change is needed for the
sake of students and teachers to solve the tension
between the legality of addressing homosexuality and
effectively teaching the curriculum.
Due to “no promo homo” laws, both straight and
LGBT teachers fear retaliatory action from schools for
speaking positively about LGBT identities. In 2014, Brett
Bigham, “the first openly gay educator to be named
Oregon Teacher of the Year” was fired months later after
he “used the role as a platform to discuss gay rights,
bullying and suicide prevention.”14 His “district saw it as
an act of war” and refused his request “to meet with a
Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) club at the local high school
about suicide prevention . . . because ‘meeting with those
students has no value to this district.’”15 However, after
his speech, Bigham attended another GSA meeting
where a participant said to him “I feel like what you did,
you did for me.”16 Although students would benefit from
reassurance by teachers, “no promo homo” laws outlaw
any form of positive speech regarding homosexuality.
Ultimately, “no promo homo” laws criminalize positive
behavior towards homosexuality by leaving teachers
open to retaliatory action.
“No promo homo” laws help to foster hostility
towards LGBT students. In 2015, “56.2% of students
reported hearing homophobic remarks from their
teachers or other school staff, and 63.5% of students
Id.
Laura Frazier, Oregon 2014 Teacher of the Year Placed on
Paid Administrative Leave, OREGONLIVE (Mar. 21, 2015),
https://www.oregonlive.com/education/index.ssf/2015/03/orego
n_2014_teacher_of_the_yea.html
[https://perma.cc/W3YPK9AL].
15 Brett Bigham, You Can Be Teacher of the Year and Still Get
Fired for Being Gay, BETTER EDUC. (Oct. 26, 2017),
http://educationpost.org/you-can-be-teacher-of-the-year-andstill-get-fired-for-being-gay/ [https://perma.cc/9PR6-VE4Q].
16 Id.
13
14
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reported hearing negative remarks about gender
expression from teachers or other school staff.”17 By
legalizing hate, teachers are permitted to discriminate
against students of all ages for their self-expression
without facing recourse. On the other hand, teachers
attempting to reaffirm students and confront their peers
or other students are unfairly treated or fired.
Comforting harassed students or mentioning positive
aspects of homosexuality would constitute promoting
homosexuality in contrast to the school district’s policies.
Anti-gay laws transform schools from safe, tolerant
spaces for learning into hostile, close-minded arenas for
torment.
Current “no promo homo” policies are too general
and imprecise to legitimately achieve the district’s
purpose in educating students without disruption
because they do not specifically instruct teachers on what
they can and cannot say about homosexuality. Most
recently, the court in Utah discussed this argument as
the plaintiff’s sought a repeal of Utah’s anti-gay
education law. The plaintiffs claimed that “[t]hese
restrictions constitute[d] impermissible content and
viewpoint discrimination and also impose[d] an
overbroad and impermissibly vague restriction on
protected speech.”18 Both parties dismissed the complaint
in return for amended legislation that erased the
prohibition of positive speech regarding homosexuality.19
Liberals and conservatives supported the act, “noting
that the revised law continues to promote abstinence

KOSCIW ET AL., supra note 10, at xvi.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3,
Equality Utah v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 2:16-CV-01081 (D.
Utah Oct. 24, 2016); see Ryan Thoreson, Utah Repeals ‘No
Promo Homo’ Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/21/utah-repeals-no-promohomo-law [https://perma.cc/PY5T-MJUF].
19 Id.
17
18
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outside of marriage in sex education classes.”20 By
creating a narrowly tailored education policy that does
not prohibit positively discussing LGBT identities, school
districts can still carry out their operations.
Efforts to amend “no promo homo” laws without
litigation have been met with reluctance. In the past,
Alabama’s law referenced “an anti-sodomy law that ha[d]
never been repealed, despite a federal ruling.”21 In 2013,
many LGBT supporters pushed for amending or
repealing the state policy.22 After four years, “[t]he
Alabama Department of Education removed this
language from its curriculum in July, defying the state
law and deleting it from the department’s content
standards.”23 It is uncertain whether the same success
can occur in the other seven states due to limited
supporters’ resources and tense political climates.
Litigation would put more pressure on legislative agents
to quickly create change.
III. The Potential Legal Tests That Apply to “No
Promo Homo” Laws
A. Connick and Pickering
Under the Connick-Pickering test, the employee,
speaking as a citizen, must be commenting on a matter
of public concern to be entitled to First Amendment
protection.24 A matter of public concern relates to “issues
of ‘political, social, or other concern to the community.’”25
The context, content, and form of the statements
determine whether the employee is speaking on a matter
Id.
ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2; Segal, supra note 12.
22 Segal, supra note 12.
23 Id.
24 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
25 Id. at 146.
20
21
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of public concern.26 Courts utilize a balancing test when
applying this standard.27
During the late 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the First Amendment rights of public
employees to prevent public employers from
circumventing the Constitution.28 A public employee is
employed by the government. In Pickering v. Board of
Education, the Court held that a teacher’s First
Amendment rights were violated when he was fired for
releasing a letter criticizing the use of school board
funds.29 In that case, the school board organized a public
vote to approve proposals for new school buildings.30
After several letters were published and the proposal was
defeated twice, the employee, Mr. Pickering, submitted a
newspaper article describing the negative effects of the
board’s indecision on students.31 In response, the school
board fired Mr. Pickering.32 The board determined the
letter contained false statements that undermined the
school’s operations.33
The Court defined the general guidelines for
public employee speech. Under the Pickering test, the
employee must speak on a matter of public concern as a
citizen to be entitled to protection under the First
Amendment.34 A matter of public concern relates to
“issues of ‘political, social, or other concern to the
community.”’35 Due to the public nature of the board’s
Id.
Id.
28 Stephen Elkind & Peter Kauffman, Gay Talk: Protecting Free
Speech for Public School Teachers, 43 J.L. & EDUC. 147, 156
(2014).
29 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
30 Id. at 566.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 567.
34 Id. at 565.
35 Hamed-Troyansky, supra note 8.
26
27
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vote, the Court considered Pickering’s speech a matter of
public concern. Next, the public employee must be
speaking as a citizen to be entitled to First Amendment
protection. When the teacher’s speech is not knowingly or
recklessly false, the speech is treated as that of a member
of the general public.36 The board provided no evidence
that showed the teacher made his allegedly false
statements recklessly or knowingly.37 In this case, the
employee was speaking on a matter of public concern as
a citizen and was entitled to First Amendment
protection.
The school district attempted to argue that public
employees gave up their First Amendment rights
completely while at work. The Court rejected the notion
that teachers would relinquish their First Amendment
rights commenting on matters that they would otherwise
freely exercise as citizens.38 In doing so, the Court
utilized a balancing test to weigh the school
administration’s interest in limiting the teacher’s
opportunities to speak in a public forum with the
teacher’s interest in making a contribution as a member
of the general public.39 The Supreme Court recognized
that the state has a strong interest in maintaining
operations through its employees.40 The Court noted that
in some contexts “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members
of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions.”41 Therefore, teachers’ interest in speaking at
their workplace was an important interest. The Court
also acknowledged the importance of a teacher’s freedom
in speaking on such matters without retaliation.42

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 583.
Id.
38 Id. at 568.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 572.
42 Id.
36
37
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Ultimately, the Court held that the state’s interest did
not outweigh the public citizens’ speech.43
For at least 15 years, teachers’ speech had been
universally protected under the First Amendment.44 In
Connick v. Myers, the Court modified the Pickering
analysis and held that the public employee was not
entitled to protection.45 In Connick, Ms. Myers, an
Assistant District Attorney, opposed her transfer to
another location.46 Upon seeing that others did not share
her same views, Myers released “a questionnaire
soliciting the views of her fellow staff members
concerning the office transfer policy.”47 Myers later
refused to transfer.48 The District Attorney, Connick,
fired Myers for insubordination that interfered with
working relationships.49 Myers argued that her First
Amendment rights had been violated and won in the
District Court pursuant to Pickering.50 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari after it was affirmed by the court
of appeals.51
The Court reversed, holding that Myers’ speech
was primarily a matter of private interest, not a matter
of public concern subject to protection under the First
Amendment.52 Myers’ speech was a matter of public
concern “in only a most limited sense” based on a
determination from the “content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”53 The
Court held that speech that is purely personal and does
Id. at 571–72.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 140.
47 Id. at 141.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 142.
52 Id. at 154.
53 Id. at 147, 154.
43
44
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not include public concern is not protected speech.54 On
the other hand, Connick’s actions were reasonable due to
the “disruptive potential” of at least one question.55
Although aspects of the questionnaire concerned matters
of public concern, the employer was given deference
because close-working relationships were vital to
“fulfilling [the] public responsibilities” of the job.56
The Connick Court’s analysis of the statement’s
context unfairly restricted the employee’s speech.57
Justice Brennan reasoned in his dissent that the Court
incorrectly weighed the context of Myers’ statement
against the employer’s need to restrict her speech.58
Myers released the questionnaire at her job, so it created
the potential for disturbing the work environment.59
Justice Brennan reasoned that Connick’s fear was
enough to outweigh the employee’s speech protections.60
In doing so, the holding arguably robbed the public of
information crucial to assess elected officials, such as
operations regarding transfers.61 The Court held that
Myers’ speech was not protected under the First
Amendment.62
B. Garcetti
Furthermore, the Court continued its restriction
on the First Amendment rights of public employees in
Garcetti v. Ceballos.63 In Garcetti, the Court held that the
First Amendment does not protect public employees’
Id. at 147.
Id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 168.
57 See id.
58 Id. at 157.
59 Id. at 153 (majority opinion).
60 Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 170.
62 Id. at 154 (majority opinion).
63 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
54
55
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speech made on the job while serving a duty.64 In
Garcetti, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered “retaliatory
employment actions” in response to incriminating
testimony that he gave while on the job.65 As deputy
prosecutor,
the
plaintiff
wrote
a
disposition
memorandum recommending the dismissal of a case on
the basis of purported governmental misconduct in
obtaining a search warrant.66 The Court reasoned that
Garcetti had no First Amendment protection due to the
memorandum being written while in his official capacity
as a public employee.67 Therefore, he was not protected
from punishment by his supervisors.
Unlike private citizens, the opinions of public
employees may interrupt the efficiency or effectiveness of
government operations.68 The Government has a
“heightened interest[] in controlling speech made by an
employee in his or her professional capacity.”69 Under
Garcetti v. Ceballos, three conditions must be met to
determine whether a public employee’s purported speech
is protected under the First Amendment. First, the
matter must be of public concern.70 Second, the
employer’s interests in effectively rendering services to
the public must outweigh the private citizen’s interest in
commenting on the matter.71 Third, the employee cannot
make comments while performing their official duties.72
The majority declined to decide whether or not to
apply this test to teachers because “[w]e need not, and for
that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we
Id. at 426.
Id. at 414–15.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 421.
68 Id. at 418.
69 Id. at 422.
70 Id. at 418.
71 Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 568
(1968)).
72 Id. at 419.
64
65
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conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”73
Three dissenting opinions in Garcetti opposed the idea of
expanding this view to educators in support of a concept
called “academic freedom.”74 Academic freedom is the
concept where “teachers necessarily speak and write
‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”75 In a moment of possible
foreshadowing to the present issue, Justice Souter’s
dissent noted that
private and public interests in addressing . . . threats to
health and safety can outweigh the government's stake
in the efficient implementation of policy, and when they
do public employees who speak on these matters in the
course of their duties should be eligible to claim First
Amendment protection.76
The issue of whether teachers are protected by the
First Amendment when speaking on public matters while
on the job is still open.
C. Tinker
The Court had previously addressed the
appropriate test for instances when the employer’s fear
or hesitation leads to an employee’s speech restriction.77
In accordance with the Connick-Pickering balancing test,
the Court may later apply the standard found in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District to
analyze speech in school.78 Under Tinker, the Court held
that the interest to protect employees from retaliation
Id. at 425.
Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 438.
76 Id. at 428.
77 See generally, Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 568
(referring to the effort to strike a balance between the interests
of public citizens and the interests of the state on matters of
public concern).
78 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
73
74
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after expressing critiques of public importance will be
weighed against the employer’s fears of disruption.79
Unlike Garcetti, the Court will only defer to school
officials when there is substantial evidence to support
that the censored speech contradicts the school’s
mission.80 Additionally, the speech must create a
material interference with the school’s activities.81 School
districts may attempt to defend their actions when there
is a reasonable expectation for disruption by students or
faculty.82 Speech restrictions will be justified with a
showing that the prohibition is based on more than a
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort or unpleasantness
[of an] unpopular viewpoint.”83 The Constitution
prohibits viewpoint discrimination that specifically
targets one side of an opinion that is unaccepted by
society.84
A prohibition singling out a particular viewpoint
is impermissible under the First Amendment.85 In
Tinker, the school allowed other students to wear
different types of political and religious symbols.86 Only
the students who were protesting with armbands were
suspended.87 This indicated that the prohibition was only
for a certain political opinion.88 Provided there is no
evidence justifying restrictions on speech, students and
teachers are entitled to freely express their views.89
Reasonable speech restrictions from public employers
Id. at 509.
Id. at 513; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422–23 (noting that in
general, supervisors must ensure employees’ official
communications promote the employer’s mission).
81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 509.
84 Id. at 508–09
85 Id. at 511.
86 Id. at 510.
87 Id. at 510–11.
88 Id. at 511.
89 See id.
79
80
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must be viewpoint neutral and equally administered to
all public employees.
In Tinker, a school district banned students from
protesting against the Vietnam War because it feared the
protests would cause disruptions to school’s activities.90
The Tinker Court held that a mere fear of disruption is
not enough to restrict the students’ or teachers’
constitutionally-protected speech.91 The school district
suspended all the students.92 The children and their
parents argued that the suspension violated their First
Amendment rights.93 The district court ruled for the
school district.94 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision.95
The problem remains regarding Tinker’s
application to teachers. The Court held that neither
students nor teachers lose their First Amendment rights
once they enter a school.96 However, the plaintiffs were
solely students. Many of the facts and analysis applied to
students’ speech. Without an explicit limitation to
students, other courts may use Tinker to analyze teacher
speech regarding viewpoint discrimination over public
matters. On the other hand, courts may read this decision
as narrowly applied to students.
IV. Analysis of “No Promo Homo” Laws Under
Each Test
A. Connick and Pickering
LGBT teachers could claim that the standard for
evaluating their speech needs to be the two-prong
Id. at 508.
Id.
92 Id. at 504.
93 Id. at 505.
94 Id. at 504–05.
95 Id. at 514.
96 Id. at 506.
90
91
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Connick-Pickering test. Following the reasoning in
Pickering, teachers, especially those that identify as
LGBT, are able to be well-informed on areas of sexual
orientation.97 Teachers have a close relationship with
students and interact with them on a daily basis, so being
able to speak positively about homosexuality will
increase their effectiveness. Anti-gay laws threaten
teachers with retaliation for non-compliance. This is
exactly the opposite outcome that Justice Marshall and
the Pickering Court wanted because teachers are legally
fired for speaking on the matter at their workplace.
The freedom to speak positively about
homosexuality is a matter of public concern. Under the
Connick-Pickering test, the employee, speaking as a
citizen, must be commenting on a matter of public
concern to be entitled to First Amendment protection.98 A
matter of public concern relates to “issues of ‘political,
social, or other concern to the community.’”99 The context,
content, and form of the statements determine whether
the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern.100
Recent political and legal events have designated
homosexuality as a matter of public concern.101 Cases like
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized the historical
developments that have addressed the political and social
concerns of LGBT citizens in both positive and negative
ways.102 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court noted the
attitude shifts that have led more LGBT citizens to live
an open and public lifestyle.103 As a result of Obergefell,

See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 566, 572 (1968).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 568.
99 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
100 Id. at 147.
101 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2596
(2015).
102 Id.
103 Id.
97
98
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society has afforded LGBT citizens the same marital
rights as heterosexual individuals.104
Instead, school districts may argue that this
speech reflects private matters. However, the ability to
speak positively on homosexuality would not be limited
to LGBT teachers. There is also no indication that LGBT
teachers would share intimate information with their
students when speaking positively about homosexuality.
Many heterosexual teachers are able to talk positively
about heterosexual relationships or friendships without
sharing intimate details. Increasing numbers of students
come from homosexual families or have LGBT friends.
Students’ perspectives on issues surrounding family,
work, and political matters concern public interests,
regardless of sexual orientation. All teachers should be
able to speak positively about homosexuality in an
objective way that separates their personal life from their
professional job to create a more holistic and empathetic
understanding in students.
Next, the public employee must be speaking as a
citizen to be entitled to First Amendment protection.105
As long as teachers do not make knowingly or recklessly
false statements about homosexuality, their speech is
treated as that of a member of the general public.106 If
teachers make knowingly or recklessly false statements,
they are not speaking as a member of the general public
and no longer enjoy constitutional protection. The repeal
of “no promo homo” laws would allow teachers to speak
truthfully about issues of homosexuality. Similarly to
Pickering, teachers could claim that they should enjoy
protection for speech that they would otherwise enjoy as
a public citizen.107
Lastly, the court must weigh the school
administration’s interest in limiting the teacher’s
Id.
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
106 See id. at 574.
107 Id. at 565.
104
105
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opportunities to speak in a public forum with the
teacher’s interest in contributing as a member of the
general public.108 The state has a strong interest in
maintaining school operations by regulating its
teachers.109 However, teachers would have a stronger
interest in being able to speak on matters without fear of
retaliation.110 Additionally, teachers could provide
evidence that they have interests in educating and
comforting students. It would be difficult for schools to
show that speaking positively on homosexuality would
have catastrophic or substantial effects on the operations
of schools.
Generally, if LGBT teachers were to undergo
analysis under Connick-Pickering test, the courts would
recognize that teachers’ First Amendment rights are
protected.111 Currently, teachers who directly contradict
the anti-gay statutes in place suffer retaliatory action or
harassment from their peers. These actions would not
withstand scrutiny under Connick-Pickering because the
interests of the state do not outweigh the interest to
protect employees from retaliation for voicing critiques
that could benefit the community.112 School districts
must become more tolerant as the rights and privileges
of LGBT individuals become recognized.
B. Garcetti
The Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos left the
question of teacher speech made on school grounds open
to interpretation. Most circuits have abstained from
addressing whether teachers are subjected to Garcetti’s

Id. at 568.
Id.
110 Id. at 572.
111 Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
112 Id.
108
109
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analysis.113 Yet, some circuits have applied Garcetti to
hold that teachers’ First Amendment rights were not
violated.114 The Supreme Court has not resolved this
dispute amongst circuits as to whether teachers have
First Amendment protection when speaking among
students in their work capacity. A case regarding
teachers’ rights to positively discuss homosexuality in “no
promo homo” states could provide a solid affirmative
answer if the Court proceeds to use either the ConnickPickering or Tinker test.
However, there is a possibility that the Court will
extend Garcetti to teacher speech. If so, the Court will
likely hold that teachers do not have First Amendment
protection while speaking on the job, regardless of
whether the matter is of personal concern. The teachers
would likely lose because they are speaking on the job.115
This prong would restrict protection for every statement
made during school hours and within the school building.
School districts would reason that they have a
heightened interest in controlling speech made by
employees in their official capacity because it directly
affects their operations. Teachers may present evidence
that their speech would address misconceptions or
supplement the curriculum rather than negatively affect
their operation. However, teachers are unlikely to
succeed because schools are essentially “hiring speech”
that must succumb to their perspectives on
curriculum.116
Courts could restrict the implementation of
Garcetti’s analysis to limited situations where it is
See Lee v. York Cty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694 (4th Cir.
2007); Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 171 n.13 (3d Cir.
2008).
114 Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2011); see Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477
(7th Cir. 2007).
115 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
116 Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
113
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essential to restrict teacher’s speech due to the topic’s
nature.117 However, this need does not apply to
homosexuality in “no promo homo” states. Restrictions on
teacher speech that relegate them to only speak
negatively about homosexuality render teachers
ineffective in the classroom by damaging the positive
environment in schools, perpetuating a culture of
intolerance, and often disseminating outdated and
misleading information to students. The Garcetti holding
enables communities to quietly “promote intolerance of
homosexuality and strip teachers of their constitutional
right to discuss homosexuality with their students in
certain situations.”118
C. Tinker
Teachers would meet more success if the Supreme
Court used the Tinker analysis.119 Under Tinker, school
districts may not restrict speech surrounding sexual
orientation merely because it may cause a disruption.120
There must be substantial evidence that supports the
school districts’ belief that the speech conflicts with the
schools’ mission and that it will cause a material
disturbance in school activities.121 This is a higher burden
on school districts to meet. In doing so, the Court may
determine that some school districts simply do not agree
with homosexuality. However, the Constitution and legal
precedent protect speech that may be disliked by the
masses.122 Teachers may counteract school districts’
claims by bringing data that shows the positive
See Johnson, 658 F.3d at 966; Mayer, 474 F.3d at 479.
Elkind & Kauffman, supra note 28. See Evans-Marshall v.
Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
119 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
120 Id. at 509.
121 Id. at 513.
122 Id. at 509.
117
118
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sentiment towards homosexual enfranchisement or the
negative impact “no promo homo” policies have on the
academic, mental, and emotional state of LGBT students.
The strongest claim for teachers against “no
promo homo” laws are those that allege viewpoint
discrimination. Teachers may assert that “no promo
homo” laws are not neutral. These policies do not punish
those who refuse to talk about homosexuality or only talk
negatively about the topic. Instead, they punish those
who speak positively about homosexuality, which
amounts to viewpoint discrimination. This has the
harmful effect of stifling students’ growth and
understanding of a controversial topic. On the other
hand, school districts may counter-argue that the policy
is nevertheless justified because it is “narrowly tailored
to further a ‘substantial’ state interest in preventing a
disruption.”123
Schools may also argue that this
restriction applies to all teachers and that it does not
discriminate one viewpoint. However, schools are likely
to fail this requirement because it only punishes those
that speak positively about homosexuality.
Teachers should be allowed to discuss sexual
orientation as it pertains to the curriculum to support
LGBT students because “there is no precedent that LGBT
advocacy . . . would ever create a disruption sufficient to
justify this limitation.”124 The Tenth Circuit has
recognized that speech that “substantially addresses
LGBT issues” by making “statements aimed at legal and
political change” are core protected speech under the
First Amendment.125 This is not to say that teachers
should be allowed to talk freely about homosexuality at
any time. Teachers’ speech must be reasonably related to
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 71 (1983).
124 Jillian Lenson, Litigation Primer Attacking State “No Promo
Homo” Laws: Why “Don't Say Gay” Is Not O.K., 24 TUL. J.L. &
SEXUALITY 145, 153 (2015).
125 Id.
123
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the schools’ mission and for the purpose of effectively
running school operations to be protected.
V. Conclusion
Whether teacher speech is entitled to
constitutional protection has yet to be addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Currently, the Supreme Court has
not designated a test to apply for teacher speech in
school. “No promo homo” laws restrict teacher speech
advocating homosexuality. Without guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts have broad discretion in
upholding these discriminatory policies.
In evaluating public employees’ First Amendment
rights, the Court has recognized three tests: the ConnickPickering test,126 the Garcetti test,127 and the Tinker
test.128 The Court declined to assess teacher speech under
the Garcetti test because the question in that case did not
call for it. As it stands, two of the three choices would
result in a win for teachers, while one would grant
deference to school districts without much regard to the
public nature of the speech. The Supreme Court should
stand by their original decision and not apply Garcetti to
“no promo homo” laws.
Furthermore, “no promo homo” laws are written
to impermissibly discriminate against one viewpoint. The
Garcetti test does not address this issue. On the other
hand, the Tinker test enables speech that dignifies all
students by protecting “unpopular” speech that is
targeted by unjustified restrictions. Currently, teachers
only face disciplinary action for advocating on behalf of
their LGBT students. This reasoning strays from the
Court’s original intention of protecting public employees

Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
128 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
126
127
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from retaliation due to their criticisms and circumvents
prior Supreme Court decisions.
As stated by Equality Utah’s Executive Director
Troy Williams at the organizations’ annual fundraiser,
“[t]he time has come to end the stigma and strike ‘no
promo homo’ from state law.”129 States should allow
teachers to present ideas on both sides and allow
students to come to their own conclusions to avoid
viewpoint discrimination. Teachers should work as
facilitators to the conversation and attempt to mitigate
any misconceptions without imposing their own personal
beliefs upon students to prevent overstepping their First
Amendment protection. The level of teacher control
should be dependent on the grade level with more
guidance being implemented for elementary and more
facilitation and mediation given in high school courses.
School districts will survive court scrutiny by
implementing viewpoint-neutral regulations that enable
teachers to control the discussion in classrooms while
validating student identities.

Jennifer Dobner, In A National First, LGBT Advocates Sue
Utah Schools Over ‘Anti-Gay’ Laws, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 25,
2016),
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=4494330&
itype=CMSID&fullpage=1 [https://perma.cc/N3N9-SHEA].
129
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Abstract
Public defenders and other court actors most often
engage in behind-the-scene plea negotiating to manage
overwhelming workloads and to dispose of cases as
quickly and efficiently as possible. In prior work, scholars
have documented an increased reliance on plea
bargaining and the deleterious impact of the practice on
the legal process and the rights of individuals accused of
a crime; however, this research has not systematically
analyzed the decisions made, and the perspectives of
justice of society’s most disadvantaged and arguably most
important actors of the court, the defendants. Relying on
data collected in a Midwestern public defense system, this
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article focuses attention to the intersection of indigent
defense and plea bargaining by shedding light on the
decision-making processes and perceptions of justice
among indigent defendants. Our findings indicate that
regardless of innocence, defendants plead guilty because
it offers the quickest pathway out of court and with little
risk; however, misunderstanding and fear often mediate
decisions to plead guilty. Also, while the majority of
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do
not always perceive the plea process as fair.
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public defense through the passage of the 6th
Amendment in 1789 and the unanimous ruling by the
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Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.1 Since
this time, attorneys assigned to provide public defense
services to individuals who are accused of a crime, but
unable to afford legal counsel, have struggled with
demanding caseloads and a lack of funding to support
their work.2 To manage overwhelming workloads,
defense attorneys and prosecutors engage in behind-thescene negotiating to dispose of cases as quickly and
efficiently as possible.3 Because negotiations result in
pleas of guilty in over ninety percent of cases, a large body
of research has considered the implications of plea
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344 (1963). While the
original decision of the Court applied to adult, felony
proceedings, the mandate has since been extended to
misdemeanor, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972);
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002), and juvenile
proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
2 See Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public
Defense, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
PROCESSES 121, 121 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Michael Barrett,
The Impact of Neglecting Indigent Defense on the Economics of
Criminal Justice, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 681, 682–86 (2016) (using
Missouri’s public defender’s system to demonstrate the funding
issues); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N. OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The
Terrible Toll of American’s Broken Misdemeanor Court 26
(2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https://
perma.cc/UZ79-VWKH]; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICAN’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 52–64 (2009), https://constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GB7-UWZK].
3 See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT
(1979); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); PETER F.
NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); Donald A. Dripps,
Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV 1343 (2015).
1
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negotiations on criminal justice actors, including
attorneys, prosecutors, and the judiciary.4 Very little
research, however, has considered the impact of plea
negotiations on the individuals whose lives are most
affected by the practice: the defendants.
The goal of this research is to examine how the
practice of plea-bargaining influences indigent defendant
decision-making, court experiences, and perspectives of
justice. Research on plea bargaining dates back to the
1920s and 1930s, prior to the passage of the 6th
Amendment. Scholarly works by Miller and Moley in
1927 and 1928, and the publication of the Wickersham
Commission report in 1931, for example, are highly
regarded for their early considerations of plea bargaining
on the legal doctrine of criminal court procedures.5
Notably, in the first published issue of Southern
California Law Review, Miller opens an article entitled,
“The Compromised of Criminal Cases” with the
statement, “In theory there should be no compromise of
criminal cases,” but “[i]n practice, [] the condonation and
compromise of criminal cases is frequent and the
methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law
are varied.”6
Since these early publications, scholars have
documented an increased reliance on plea bargaining and
the deleterious impact of the practice on the legal process
and the rights of individuals accused of a crime. Legal
advocates argue that because pleas of guilty are
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 — STATISTICAL
TABLES 22, 24 (2013); LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING (2011).
5 See 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T
(WICKERSHAM COMM’N), REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95–97
(1931); Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV.
97 (1928); Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927).
6 Miller, supra note 5, at 1–2.
4
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negotiated and agreed to outside of the courtroom and in
advance of sentencing, the plea process reallocates
control over sentencing decisions from the judiciary to the
prosecution.7 Because cases are so quickly resolved
through pleas of guilty, evidentiary and legal issues are
often suppressed and case investigation ceases to exist.8
The formulaic agreements on which plea bargains rely
often overlook the identity of those who are accused of a
crime, and thereby eliminate individualized mitigation
and consideration of rehabilitative responses.9 Moreover,
those accused of a crime find themselves pressured into
admitting guilt for fear of missing an opportunity to
decrease punishment versus extending the work of the
court which may result in harsher sentences down the
road. In 1978, Langbein went so far as to compare plea
bargaining to torture, stating that although our means
may be politer—“we use no rack, no thumbscrew, no
Spanish boot to mash his legs”—we still make it costly for
an individual accused of a criminal offense to claim their
constitutional rights.10
These concerns call attention to the importance of
understanding the impact of plea bargaining on the
experiences and perspectives of defendants and, in
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 37, 67–68 (1998);
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004).
8 FEELEY, supra note 3.
9 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901,
951 (1991) (“These guidelines also mark a changed attitude
toward sentencing—one that looks to collections of cases and
to social harm rather than to individual offenders and the
punishments they deserve.”); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy,
Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989) (“One problem
underscored in this scholarship is that individual concrete
human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict.”).
10 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 3, 12 (1978).
7
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particular, those defendants who cannot afford to retain
legal counsel. Today, indigent defendants compose the
majority of the criminal justice system, with research
indicating that between 60 percent and 90 percent of
defendants rely on court-appointed attorneys.11 In an
effort to highlight the experiences of the defendants who
most frequently interact with the criminal courts and the
plea process, this research utilizes semi-structured
interview data with defendants and administrative court
data collected in a Midwestern urban public defense
system between the years of 2008 to 2011. In the
following pages, we outline research related to the
intersection of public defense and plea bargaining, and
the decision-making process of indigent defendants and
perceptions of justice, in an effort to better understand
how criminal court processes are perceived by the
individuals who are most directly affected by their
outcomes. Our findings indicate that regardless of
innocence, defendants plead guilty because it offers the
quickest pathway out of court and with little risk;
however, misunderstanding and fear often permeate
decisions to plead guilty. While the majority of
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do
not always perceive the plea process as fair.
II. Plea Bargaining in Public Defense
It is well-documented that the plea process has
become a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in the
decades since its introduction and indoctrination in the
late 1700s and 1800s. During this era, criminal justice
JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 2 (2011); LYNN LANGTON
& DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009); Carol
J. Defrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Indigent Defense Services
in Large Counties, 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t
of Justice), Nov. 2000, at 1.
11
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grew into a professional institution, incorporating formal
police departments and court officials who became
“repeat players” in criminal cases.12 Accordingly, the
court workgroup became accustomed to the routine
disposition of cases, and to the outcomes and sentences
associated with taking a case to trial versus negotiating
a plea deal. Once outcomes and sentences of pleas and
trials became familiar to court actors, a “going rate” of
the expected sentence developed such that the system
became routine and bureaucratic and, in doing so,
increased its capacity to process more cases and at a
quicker rate.13
Today, well over 90 percent of criminal cases are
disposed through pleas of guilty. Most court actors,
including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judiciary,
argue that plea bargaining is a necessary tool in the
criminal courts, and particularly for those systems that
are overwhelmed by cases and depleted in resources.
Arguably, attorneys who are assigned to represent
indigent defendants are one of the primary groups of
court actors who are reliant on and benefit from the gains
afforded by the plea process.14 Since the inception of
FEELEY, supra note 3; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–55 (1993); LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
1870–1910 (1981); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
13 Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant
Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 237 (1978); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING:
THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS (1981); ROTHMAN, supra note 12.
14 Feeley and other scholars have argued that the plea process
is “a mixed-strategy game” in which prosecution and defense
“share in gains and losses.” FEELEY, supra note 3, at 27. For
instance, “prosecutor[s] gain[] by securing convictions.” Id.
Also, “defense gains certainty of outcome, and a reduction of
12

[465]
37

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

public defense following the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Gideon, the system has struggled with considerable
challenges that shape the ability of public defenders to
provide effective defense.15 High caseloads and a lack of
funding constrain the amount of time that public
defenders can spend with defendants and conducting
case investigation.16 Even when attorneys are available
to meet with defendants, stress related to overwhelming
workloads may lead public defenders to encourage
defendants to accept pleas of guilty in order to facilitate
case resolution.17 In some cases, defendants may be
approached with plea deals and plead guilty to
misdemeanor offenses before ever meeting attorneys. A
significant implication of these practices is that many
defendants are pleading guilty to a crime without full
knowledge or understanding of their rights, options, or
the collateral consequences of the decision.

the sentence.” Id. Further, “the state is also a beneficiary
because it secures an admission of guilt, punishes the guilty,
and yet saves the expense of a trial.” Id.
15See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)
(holding that indigent defendants are entitled to
representation, without indicating an infrastructure to allow
for such defense); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at
50–101.
16 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 6. For example,
although the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends
that public defenders not exceed national caseload standards,
many public defenders and, in particular those working in
urban areas, typically manage double that amount of cases
annually. SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013 at 5 (2016).
17 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA:
EVALUATION OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
169–70 (2016); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. SERVS., A RACE TO THE
BOTTOM: SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 39–40 (2008).
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III. Deciding to Plead Guilty
With approximately 6 million indigent individuals
receiving public defense services annually, and the
majority pleading guilty to a crime, it is critically
important to consider why individuals who are accused of
a crime decide to accept pleas of guilty. There is little
theoretical guidance on the decision-making processes of
defendants; however, there is some support to suggest
that theories of court worker decision-making may be
applicable to the decisions that defendants make.
The extent research on court worker decisionmaking offers three theories by which to interpret court
worker decisions to employ plea bargaining strategies.
First, organizational efficiency theories argue that
disparities in sentencing are the result of court actors
rewarding behavior and attitudes that are valued by the
institution—because court actors value the time and
resource-savings afforded by quick pleas of guilty,
defendants who accept plea bargains are rewarded with
less severe sentences.18 Albonetti, for example, states,
“Defendant cooperation exemplified by a willingness to
plead guilty is viewed, by the sentencing judge, as an
indication of the defendant’s willingness to ‘play the
game’ in a routine, system defined manner.” 19 Second,
theories of uncertainty avoidance argue that defendants
PETER NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING,
THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY
PLEA PROCESS 203–05 (1988); Jo Dixon, The Organizational
Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1157–58
(1995); Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish:
Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105
AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1363 (2000); Malcolm D. Holmes, Howard C.
Daudistel & William A. Taggart, Plea Bargaining Policy and
State District Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series
Analysis, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (1992).
19 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening,
and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary DecisionMaking in Felony Cases, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1986).
18
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are rewarded for pleading guilty because trials are an
inherently uncertain and stressful event for court
actors—decisions to pursue trials require prosecutors,
defenders, and judiciary to manage unreliable or
disreputable witnesses, questionable testimony, and/or
the use of less-direct evidence which may or may not
influence a decision of guilt. Plea deals are therefore
encouraged to reduce the uncertainty of decisions and
outcomes. A final theory, and one that is highlighted by
the sentencing guidelines, argues that the decision to
plead guilty as opposed to taking a case to trial is
associated
with
differences
in
perceived
blameworthiness.20 The federal guidelines state that
defendants should receive guideline-based sentencing
discounts or departures for “acceptance of responsibility”
and “substantial assistance to law enforcement.”21 Thus,
defendants who plead guilty, and therefore accept
responsibility, are rewarded with lighter sentences than
those who may not be perceived as accepting
responsibility and showing remorse for behavior.
In contrast to arguments that plea bargaining is a
coercive practice, there is some scholarly discussion to
suggest that a defendant’s decision to accept a plea of
guilty is arrived at through a rational decision-making
process that is not dissimilar to the process by which
court actors decide to employ plea bargaining. More
specifically, advocates of plea bargaining argue that the
process affords the defendant the opportunity to
participate in a rational decision-making process
whereby the costs associated with extending a case are
weighed against the possibility of reduced sentencing or
acquittal.22 Research in misdemeanor courts, in
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009).
21 Id.
22 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1136–38 (2008); Candice McCoy, Plea Bargaining as
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea-Bargaining Reform, 50
20
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particular, has shown that defendants care less about the
outcome of the case and more about the efficiency
provided by the plea process, which can offset financial
costs and time investment associated with extending the
length of cases.23 However, it might also be the case that
an efficiency theory may only apply to defendants
charged with less severe offenses. In other words,
defendants who are charged with a misdemeanor offense
that carries less severe sentencing outcomes might be
more inclined to plead guilty to “get it over with”;
whereas defendants charged with a felony offense that
carries more severe sentencing outcomes might be more
invested in the outcome of the case and, particularly if
they believe they are innocent. Another argument
suggests that defendants decide to enter a plea of guilty
in an effort to decrease the uncertainty of verdicts that
might be made by a jury or a judge at a later point in
time. In this regard, theories of uncertainty avoidance
argue that the plea process provides both defendants and
court actors with respite from the stress associated with
trial work. Finally, defendant decision-making may be
driven by blameworthiness. The decision to accept a plea
of guilty, therefore, is made in an effort to accept
responsibility and express remorse for the offense.
IV. Perceptions of Justice
Scholars often cite decision-making as an
important contributing factor to overall perceptions of
fairness and justice. Indeed, the most common criticism
of plea bargaining is that the process limits the
defendant’s ability to be involved in the procedures and
decisions made in their case. This criticism, however, is
CRIM. L.Q. 67, 69, 73 (2005); Bibas, supra note 7, at 2496–99,
2507; Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 950–51 (1986); Langbein,
supra note 10, at 8.
23 FEELEY, supra note 3, at 187–89.
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juxtaposed by scholars who argue that the plea process
should be positively associated with perceptions of justice
because the process requires defendants to make the
decision about whether or not to accept a plea bargain,
which is associated with the outcome of their case.24
Despite the arguments on both sites, a relatively small
body of research has actually considered the implications
of plea bargaining on defendant experiences and
perspectives of justice and fairness. The studies that do
exist are more than thirty years old and rely on data
collected in very different court settings than the ones
defendants encounter today.25
Classical work on how defendants perceive court
experiences has focused on theories of distributive justice
JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 94 (1972).
25 For example, previous influential work on plea bargaining
by CASPER, supra note 13, supra note 24, by Tom Tyler, The
Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984), and by
FEELEY, supra note 3, in the 1970s and 1980s predate
mandatory sentencing laws and “tough on crime” policies that
have reshaped courtroom justice and increased the stakes for
defendants. The effect of these laws can be seen most directly
in today’s record high jail and prison populations; however,
“tough on crime” policies have also increased both the number
of low-level, petty offenders charged in misdemeanor courts
and increased the amount of time and cost necessary to defend
criminal cases charged in felony courts, BORUCHOWITZ, supra
note 2 at 7, 25. In addition, defendants today face more civil
sanctions as a result of criminal convictions, including the loss
of legal immigration status, public benefits, housing, driver’s
license, and employment. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2 at 7, 25;
CASPER, supra note 13; CASPER, supra note 24; FEELEY, supra
note 3; Tyler, supra note 25; Becky Pettit & Bruce
Western, Mass Imprisonment and Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 153
(2004); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State
Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996).
24
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which extend early formulations of Adam’s equity theory
to argue that individuals assess satisfaction with
outcomes when they are perceived as comparable to the
outcomes incurred by others.26 Research in a variety of
contexts, including the courts, shows that distributive
justice is an influential factor in determining individuals’
perception of outcome fairness.27 For example, Casper’s
research in the 1970s shows that male defendants who
consider their outcome to be fair are most likely to
indicate that they perceive their sentence as a “good
break,” or a reasonable sentence relative to the going rate
for the offense.28
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker moved beyond the
basic
assumptions
of
distributive
justice
by
hypothesizing that satisfaction with court outcomes is
independently influenced by perceptions of procedural
justice—judgments about the fairness of the resolution
process.29 Theories of procedural justice argue that
evaluations of justice and outcome fairness are
influenced by the opportunities that defendants have to
be involved in the decisions made in their case (decision
control) and the opportunities that defendants have to
participate in the proceedings of their case by expressing
J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272–76 (Leonard
Berkowetz ed., 1965).
27 E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 10–12 (1988); Adams, supra note 26, at
272–76; Dean B. McFarlin & Paul D. Sweeney, Distributive
and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Satisfaction with
Personal and Organizational Outcomes, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J.
626, 629, 634 (1992); Robert Folger & Mary Konovsky, Effects
of Procedural and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay
Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 115–16 (1989); Jerald
Greenberg, Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT. 399, 400, 402–04, 406 (1987).
28 CASPER, supra note 13.
29 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
26
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their side of the story and presenting personal
information and evidence that is relevant to their case
(process control). One of the most striking discoveries of
the research completed by Thibaut and Walker was the
finding that satisfaction and perceived fairness are
affected by factors other than whether the defendant
“won” or “lost” their case.30 In this regard, Thibaut and
Walker’s research was the first to suggest that it is
possible to enhance defendant’s perceptions of fair
treatment without focusing explicitly on distributive
fairness.
More recently, scholars have extended theories of
procedural justice to include the behaviors of the actors
who implement legal processes, and to argue that
perceptions of fairness are closely tied to legitimacy and
the likelihood that individuals will obey the law.31 In this
regard, if defendants perceive court processes and the
behaviors of court actors, including publicly assigned
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges, as fair, they
will be more likely to view courts as legitimate and
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. However, if
defendants perceive the processes and the behaviors of
court actors as unfair, they will be less likely to view
courts as legitimate and subsequently less likely to
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. Research on
policing practice indicates that when police treat citizens
Id; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure,
66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 548–49 (1978).
31 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN HUO. TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND
COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Process Based Regulation:
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 297, 306–07, 309–10 (2003); Jason
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 513, 514, 523 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J.
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice,
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 263, 270 (2004).
30
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fairly and with respect, police legitimacy is enhanced, as
well as citizen cooperation and support of police officers,
although limited research has focused specific attention
to the association between perceptions of criminal court
processes and actors, and legitimacy and law-abiding
behavior.32
V. Race and Class
Particularly important to understanding how
individuals accused of a crime make decisions to accept a
plea of guilty and their perceptions of justice is the impact
of race and class. When this research was conducted,
black defendants accounted for 37 percent of adults aged
40 or older and 55 percent of juveniles charged with a
criminal offense in urban courts.33 Today, black
individuals account for approximately 13 percent of the
U.S.
population,34
yet
black
men
represent
approximately 40 percent of incarcerated individuals.35
In addition, at least 40 percent of individuals imprisoned
cannot read, and over two-thirds are either unemployed

Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The
War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice
System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 467–68 (2006); Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 31, at 514, 520; Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 31, at
275–77; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in
Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239–40, 242
(2008); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher,
Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 629, 645–46 (1989).
33 REAVES, supra note 4, at 5.
34 QuickFacts: Population Estimates, July 1, 2018, (V2018),
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/R3VH-SWKQ].
35 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2016, at 7 (2018).
32
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or underemployed when arrested.36 Decades of research
on racial disparity and criminal justice, in conjunction
with the most recent deadly encounters between law
enforcement and black citizens, highlights the need to be
cognizant of the impact of relentless policing efforts and
harsh sentencing practices on the daily experiences of
poor, black individuals who are accused of a crime.
Crime policies in the 1980s and 1990s increased
the presence of the criminal justice system in the lives of
poor communities; the war on drugs, in particular,
increased the frequency and type of police-citizen
encounters in urban city areas. As a result, the criminal
justice system has not only become a primary source of
civic education for the poor but has led to distrust and
disillusionment with the “system.” Previous research
shows that this distrust has typically been directed
towards law enforcement and is shaped by race.37 Zerotolerance policing and the use of aggressive police tactics
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
(2006); MICHAEL H. TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING
AMERICAN DILEMMA 12–13 (2011); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL H. TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1995); Kevin L. Jackson, Differences in the Background and
Criminal Justice Characteristics of Young Black, White and
Hispanic Male Federal Prison Inmates, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 494,
497 (1997); David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to
Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 646 (1993).
37 Bobo & Thompson, supra note 32, at 467; Jon Hurwitz &
Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions
of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762,
767 (2005); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of
Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 443 (2002); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A.
Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the
Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 502 (1999); Richard
Scaglion & Richard G. Condon, Determinants of Attitudes
Toward City Police, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 489 (1980).
36
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have prompted accusations of racial profiling and
contributed to tense relationships between law
enforcement and residents of high-crime areas.
Yet, the extent to which class and race are
associated with negative attitudes towards criminal
courts remains the subject of debate. It seems probable
that negative perceptions of law enforcement would
extend to the entire legal system. Bobo and Johnson, for
example, argue that black individuals “are far more
likely to believe” that the administration of criminal
justice is “riddled with systematic bias” based on negative
encounters with law enforcement.38 Hurwitz and Peffley
argue that because legal perspectives are based
predominantly on personal experiences with criminal
justice actors in communities, negative interactions with
law enforcement heavily contribute to an overall
perception that the justice system as inherently unfair.39
Moreover, Lind and Tyler assert that people who believe
the justice system to be unfair tend to evaluate the entire
political system as less legitimate—for much of the poor,
the justice system is as close as individuals come to the
government.40 Thus, low levels of support for police may
bridge across institutions, undermine support for the
broader system, and influence decision-making and
perceptions of justice related to court processes and plea
bargains.
VI. The Current Study
This study focuses attention to the intersection
between public defense and plea bargaining, and the
decision-making process of indigent defendants and
Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste For
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death
Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156–157
(2004).
39 Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 767.
40 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 70.
38
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perceptions of justice. The overarching goal of this
research is to raise awareness of and increase knowledge
on the experiences of the individuals who are accused of
a crime and, in particular, those who are financially
unable to retain private counsel and therefore are reliant
on the legal services of a public defender. In doing so, we
rely on the theories of decision-making and perceptions
of justice presented in the previous pages to guide our
analysis but shift the prior application of these theories
away from court actors and police to indigent defendants
and the courts. The key research questions that guide
this study include:
1. Why do defendants plead guilty?
2. How does the decision to accept a plea influence
perspectives of case outcomes?
3. Do defendants perceive the plea process as fair
and why or why not?
VII. Data and Methods
The findings of this study are guided by
qualitative and administrative data collected between
the years of 2008 and 2011 in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, located in Hennepin County, Minneapolis,
Minnesota. When this study was completed, Hennepin
County was the largest county in Minnesota with a
population of slightly over 1 million, or approximately 25
percent of the state population.41 Hennepin County is one
of ten judicial districts in Minnesota, and one of two
judicial districts with a full-time public defender office.
Over forty percent of the total number of adult criminal
PopFinder For Minnesota, Counties, & Regions, MINN. STATE
DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., https://mn.gov/admin/demography/databy-topic/population-data/our-estimates/pop-finder1.jsp
[https://perma.cc/ZX8H-M5T8].
41
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cases in the state were processed through the Hennepin
County court. Black individuals comprised fifty percent
of defendants who received the services of a public
defender in Hennepin County; twenty-four percent were
female (see Table 1 for a description of defendants).
Administrative data was obtained for all cases
that were referred to Hennepin County between the
years of 2008–2011. Qualitative data was collected in
2010 and 2011 and relies on observational data collected
in over 250 misdemeanor and felony cases across six
public defenders and semi-structured interviews with 40
defendants. Observations included defender-client
interviews and meetings held in jail, custody, court, and
defender offices, and defender-prosecutor negotiations
held in judges’ chambers and in and outside of the
courtroom. Cases observed for this study were not
randomly selected, but rather, were dependent on the
public defender’s calendar and the defendants that were
assigned to the defender on a particular day. All
defendants included in this research consented to the
study during their first appearance with the public
defender. Cases were tracked as they progressed through
disposition, unless the case was dismissed, the defendant
was rearrested, the case was transferred to a specialty
court, or the defendant failed to appear.
Informal defendant interviews were conducted
throughout the case, and forty defendants were formally
interviewed following case disposition. Informal
interviews with defendants typically occurred in court
hallways while the defendants were waiting for their
cases to be called and were used to collect data on what
they understood to be happening in their cases, desired
outcomes, perceptions of interactions with their public
defender and the plea bargains that had been offered, as
well as considerations for accepting or rejecting a plea
offer. Formal interviews occurred in a designated,
confidential space, including libraries, parks, and
correctional institutions. Formal interviews lasted
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anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours and included
questions about defendants’ understanding of the
procedures and outcome of their cases, the fairness of
their outcomes, decisions made in their cases,
experiences with their public defenders, and whether
they felt as if race/ethnicity impacted their court
experiences. Interviews also included questions taken
from prior research with defendants by Tyler and Casper
to collect data on procedural justice, including
perceptions of the processes and outcomes of their cases,
their ability to participate in the decisions made in their
case, and whether they felt as if they had a voice and were
respected.42
A. Analytic Strategy
Detailed notes were taken and recorded
throughout this research. Formal interviews were audio
recorded and transcribed for data analysis. To answer the
research questions of this study, analysis of formal
interviews on defendant decision-making included
responses to the following questions: Why did you accept
a plea of guilty instead of pursue a trial?; What factors
did you consider when you were making the decision to
plead guilty?; Did you originally intend or want to plead
guilty?; and, Did you understand the plea-bargaining
process and the outcome? All responses are coded into one
of three themes, following the theoretical literature on
plea bargain decision-making—Efficiency, Uncertainty
Avoidance, and Blameworthiness. Analysis of perceptions
of justice included responses to the following questions:
Do you think that the outcome of your case was fair?; Do
you think that the procedures were fair?; Were you
satisfied with the use of plea bargaining in your case?;
Did you feel as if you had the ability to participate in the
decisions made in your case?; Did you feel that you had a
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); CASPER,
supra note 24, at 90–91.
42
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voice, and that you were listened to?; Do you feel that you
were respected?; Did you feel as if your lawyer wanted
you to plead guilty?; Did you feel that your lawyer was on
your side?; and, Did you feel that your lawyer was fair to
you?
In the following pages, we first present findings
on why defendants decide to plead guilty and then
consider perceptions of the plea outcome and process.
Because data was collected across varying levels of case
severity, we consider how perceptions differ among
individuals charged with felonies and less serious
charges. Past research has not considered how both
defendant characteristics and case severity interact with
and influence differences in court experiences; however,
it is possible that defendants who face more severe
sanctions, including imprisonment, loss of employment,
and loss of housing, may be more concerned with the
outcomes of their case and inclined to more actively
participate in the procedures and decisions made in their
case. In contrast, defendants who are confronted with
less severe sanctions may articulate less concern with the
procedures and outcomes of their case and, therefore, not
be as inclined to participate in their case. It is also likely
that defendants who are solely charged with
misdemeanors have fewer opportunities to participate in
the procedures of their case. Because misdemeanor
courtrooms often have many cases to consider in a
relatively short amount of time, attorney-client
interactions are quick and succinct.
VIII. Results
The characteristics of all Hennepin County
defendants, defendants who received legal services
through the public defender’s office, and the defendants
interviewed for this study are reported in Table 1.
Similar to courts across the U.S., Hennepin County
defendants are disproportionately poor, young, and male.
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Black defendants represent thirty percent of the total
population but fifty percent of defendants who received
legal services through the public defender’s office. Over
sixty percent of both the total sample and the defendants
who received legal services through the public defender’s
office were charged with a misdemeanor offense—an
offense that carries a sentence of up to a maximum of
ninety days in jail and/or a $1000 fine. The demographics
of defendants interviewed for this study are
representative of those who received legal service
through the public defender’s office; however, defendants
charged with a felony are overrepresented compared to
the number of felony cases represented by public
defenders (sixty percent and seventeen percent,
respectively). All defendants who were interviewed for
this study and who were convicted and sentenced
accepted an offer to plead guilty. Six defendants
interviewed had their case dismissed, but five out of the
six attended several court dates and entertained plea
offers until their cases were dismissed.
Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Defendants (D’s) in Hennepin
County, the Public Defender’s Office, and the Interview Sample
(2009, Most Serious Charge Per Case)
Defendants
Defendants of the
Defendants in
of Hennepin Public Defender’s
the Interview
County
Office
Sample
Total

59,484

21,848

40

n

%

n

%

n

%

Male

42,382

71

16,494

75

31

77

Female

15,060

25

5,073

24

9

23

Missing

2,042

4

281

1

--

--

White

18,204

31

5,180

24

13

33

Black

21,866

37

11,013

50

24

60

Hispanic

2,836

5

1,131

5

--

--

Other2

16,578

27

4,524

21

3

7

Gender

Race
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Age
< 18

171

<1

20

<1

--

--

18-25

18,600

31

7,781

36

14

36

26-35

17,576

29

6,026

27

9

22

36-45

11,680

20

4,297

20

9

22

46-55

8,406

14

3,054

14

8

20

> 56

3,051

5

670

3

--

--

Felony

5,229

9

3,794

17

24

60

Gross
Misdemeanor

6,257

11

2,813

13

2

5

Misdemeanor

38,748

65

15,032

69

14

35

Petty
Misdemeanor

9,250

15

209

1

--

--

Homicide

44

<1

31

<1

--

--

Assault

4,400

7

2,852

13

3

8

Domestic

706

1

509

2

4

10

Sex Offense

481

<1

304

1

2

5

Weapons

606

1

432

2

0

--

Drugs

1,463

2

831

4

4

10

Property

2,607

4

1,785

9

16

40

Alcohol

7,979

13

2,552

12

1

2

Conduct3

15,317

26

8,058

37

3

8

Traffic

24,797

42

4,222

19

7

17

Other4

1,084

2

272

1

--

--

Free,
Appointed
Counsel

21,848

37

21,848

100

40

10
0

Private
Attorney

11,720

20

--

--

--

--

None

25,916

43

--

--

--

--

Dismissed5

29,081

49

12,185

56

6

15

Convicted

15,567

26

6,238

29

14

35

Charge

Offense

Legal
Representation

Disposition
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Stay of
Imposition6
Continued7

2,187

3

978

4

6

15

12,621

21

2,428

11

14

35

Missing

28

<1

19

<1

--

--

Data obtained from Hennepin County Research Division; Data
contains all adult criminal cases filed; Data includes only one
charge per criminal case.
2 Includes Native American (3%), Asian (2%), Hawaiian (<1%), and
defendants whose race is missing.
3 Includes defendants charged with disorderly conduct, trespassing,
loitering, solicitation, obstructing justice, etc.
4 Includes defendants charged with land, housing, boating, animal
violations, etc.
5 Includes cases that were dismissed for mental incompetence (<1%)
and cases that were acquitted (<1%).
6 A stay of imposition (SOI) or stay of execution occurs when an
imposition is pronounced but delayed to a further date. If the offender
complies with the conditions of the court, a felony conviction will be
reduced to a misdemeanor conviction. If the offender fails to comply
with the conditions of the court, the court may hold a hearing and
impose/execute the sentence.
7 Includes cases with a disposition of stay of adjudication (SOA) or
continued without prosecution (CWOP). SOAs and CWOPs occur
when a defendant pleads guilty and the case is continued for
dismissal. SOAs and CWOPs do not result in a conviction unless the
defendant violates conditions of the court. SOAs and CWOPs include
cases that are diverted through probation and/or diversion programs.
1

A. Deciding to Plead Guilty—Efficiency,
Avoiding Uncertainty, and Blameworthiness
Table 2 presents the proportion of defendants who
pled guilty for reasons associated with efficiency,
avoiding uncertainty, and blameworthiness. The smallest
proportion of defendants (11 percent) indicated that they
pled guilty because they committed the crime and felt
that they needed to take responsibility for their
behaviors. The largest proportion (50 percent) of
defendants indicated that they pled guilty because of the
efficiency offered by the plea process. The second largest
group of defendants (38 percent) indicated that they pled
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guilty because they did not want to risk taking their case
to trial and receiving a more severe sentence.
Table 2. Defendant Decisions to Plead Guilty*

Total

Blameworthiness
n
%

Efficiency
n
%

Uncertainty
Avoidance
n
%

4

11.7

17

50.0

13

38.3

Gender
Male

2

8.0

13

52.0

10

40.0

Female

2

22.0

4

44.6

3

33.4

2

15.4

6

46.1

5

38.5

Black

2

10.5

10

52.6

7

36.9

Other

--

--

1

50.0

1

50.0

1

9.0

7

63.6

3

27.2

3

13.0

10

43.5

10

43.5

Race
White

Charge
Misdemeanor
and Gross
Felony
Priors
Yes

2

8.0

13

52.0

10

40.0

No

2

22.2

4

44.5

3

33.3

--

--

2

33.3

4

66.7

In Custody
Yes

No
4
14.3
15
53.6
9
32.1
* Results do not include those defendants whose case was dismissed
(N = 6)

Black and white defendants, and those with and
without prior convictions, indicated that they pled guilty
because of the time and money savings associated with
accepting a plea deal. Two-thirds of defendants who were
facing a less severe charge than a felony pled to “get it
over with,” and half of those charged with a felony made
the same decision. The finding that individuals charged
with a felony enter pleas of guilty because of the
[483]
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efficiency offered by the plea process is somewhat
surprising. Research in the lower courts indicates that
defendants who are charged with misdemeanors are most
concerned about how quickly the case can be resolved,
versus the outcome of the case.43 For individuals who are
charged with more severe offenses, we often assume that
there will be an increased concern with the procedures
and outcome of the case, versus the efficiency of the
process. Our finding, however, indicates that individuals
who are charged with a felony are not dissimilar from
individuals who are charged with less severe offenses
when making decisions about whether to enter a plea of
guilty.
Over half of the individuals who indicated that
they accepted a plea of guilty for reasons associated with
efficiency and uncertainty avoidance were incarcerated
pretrial. This finding is supported by prior research on
the impact of pretrial custody which indicates that
prosecutorial offers to “get out of jail” typically trumps
defendants’ interest in pursuing a trial because of the
time required to take a case to trial and the risks
associated.44 This finding is articulated through the
following statements made by defendants:
Personally, I would just go with whatever
they give me so I can hurry up and get out
of there. I just went on and told them yep,
yep, whatever, anything as long as it’s
going to get me out of here. (male, black,
felony)

FEELEY, supra note 3.
Albert A. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61–62 (1968); Bowers, supra
note 22, at 1133; FEELEY, supra note 3; Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2146 (1998).
43
44
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Nah, I ain’t taking nothing to trial. Plead,
give them what they want, get out. A lot of
people can’t take it to trial because they got
family shit at home. (male, black, felony)
While the majority of defendants articulated support for
an efficiency perspective of decision-making, how they
arrived at their final decision was nuanced and
contextualized by considerations of guilt and risk.
Defendants indicated that they decided not to take their
case to trial because it would require too much time and
money. However, this decision was often juxtaposed by
defendants stating that they were guilty—so why fight
it?—or that they did not want to risk the outcome of a
trial—so why spend the time on taking it to trial?
It’s too emotionally and physically
draining for somebody to have to go
through that [trial]. And then, you know,
that means I have to take more time off
work, more time finding someone to watch
my kids, more time to do this. It’s just not
worth it overall. I’ll take my responsibility.
I'm in trouble, I’ll take my year of
probation, I’ll do my fines and then it’s
done. It just seemed like an easier way to
go. Less fines. No jail time . . . I know I did
something
wrong.
(female,
white,
misdemeanor)
They was offering me six years, you know
what I’m saying, so I fought it. I fought it
for like four and a half months. I’m sitting
down in the county [jail] just fighting it.
Like no way, I’m not taking this. I didn’t
do nothing and I shouldn’t even be here.
But, like the deals are getting worse and
worse and worse. They first offered me 48
[485]
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months and then they went to 52 and then
they went to 57, so they kept climbing the
deals…No I didn’t take it to trial because
they said if I don’t take it to trial they’ll just
give me four more months. Just do four
more months because I already did four
more months. So they made it seem so
sweet to me, but it hurt me in the long run,
you know, because I’ve never been in jail
before. So I’m panicking, I’m in jail for four
months and I’m like oh my goodness seems
like I’ve been gone for like two years just
sitting in a little cage, cell by yourself is
crazy. I’ve never been in that position so I’m
like freaking out. I wanted to take it to
trial, but I just couldn’t handle the jail, you
know, and what if I did lose because, you
know, I don’t know. I would never want to
use it as an excuse, but you know I just felt
that I might have lost. If I would have lost,
I would have been sitting in prison for six
years. (male, black, felony)
B.
Deciding
to
Plead
Misunderstanding and Fear

Guilty—

While theories of efficiency, uncertainty
avoidance, and blameworthiness are associated with
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty, the most commonly
articulated factors that mediated decisions to accept a
plea of guilty were misunderstanding and fear. The
observational and interview findings of this study
suggest that defendants do not understand the charges
to which they are pleading guilty, the sentence, and the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty. Stemming from
misunderstandings about the plea process and the legal
language associated with plea bargains, defendants
entered pleas of guilty to exit a situation that they do not
[486]
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understand and have little control over.
I believe like at court when they brought it
up it was kind of like a deal saying that I
would have been on probation for two
years—felony probation. And you know, I
do kind of have a little experience with
court . . . but not really as an adult. So I
didn’t really know what was going to
happen. And I . . . you know I really didn’t
want to go through that whole process so I
took the first thing that was handed to me.
And that’s kind of what got me in this
situation . . . well not exactly this situation
but got me on probation. But you know I
really don’t, you know. And . . . ah . . . yeah,
I just feel like the decisions that was made
was a part of me being tired of dealing with
things, and not understanding what was
going on. . . . I just felt like I didn’t want to
deal with it. (male, black, felony)
Particularly when it’s your first time in
there, it’s scary. Everything is moving
quickly. A lot of people they talk like they
get very frustrated by that and they get
more scared because they have no idea
what’s going on, and then you’re asked to
make pretty quick decisions. And most
people like me myself personally I would
just go with whatever they give me so I can
hurry up and get out of there. Sometimes I
just agree just to get out of jail or to get out
of the court room. Like the day we were
there for the pre-trial [conference] I was
already ready to take whatever they were
going to give me. (male, black,
misdemeanor)
[487]
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I don’t even want to risk it. I’m not too—I
don’t know too much about the system or
the law or too much about that. I never
really had to deal with it like that. So
taking them to court, I think it would be a
waste of time because I don’t get it. I’ll just
move on. (male, black, misdemeanor)
Defendants often considered not accepting a plea of guilty
and taking their case to trial, but out of fear, ended up
accepting a plea of guilty. This finding is particularly
relevant as scholarly interest in wrongful convictions in
the U.S. has garnered increasing attention over the past
decade due in large part to a growing public awareness of
wrongful convictions, and the increasing number of
individuals whose sentences are vacated because they
were convicted of a crime that they did not commit. Since
1989, more than 2,100 people have had their sentences
vacated.45 In 2017 alone, more than 130 individuals were
identified as convicted for a crime that they did not
commit.46 Although estimates of the rate of wrongful
convictions vary, and typically focus on capital charges
and cases in which charges have been vacated,
observational and interview data collected in this study
suggest that defendants who are charged with
misdemeanor and felony offenses and whom claim
innocence do plead guilty.
I took a plea agreement without even
knowing what I was going to get. Like not
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE,
EXONERATIONS IN 2017, at 3(2017).
46 Id. This number does not include approximately 96
individuals whose drug-related convictions were found to be
the result of systematic framing on the part of police officers in
Baltimore and Chicago. Id. at 1. At the time of publication, 176
sentences have been vacated and more are expected to occur in
2018.
45
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even a full understanding, I just, I don’t
know. Like my public defender wanted me
to keep the plea as not guilty. Like he told
me that a couple times and like I just
wanted out. I’d rather, I guess I’d rather
have my plea as not guilty if I could have
stayed out and gone to trial. If I knew I was
going to be out then I pled not guilty
because I don’t think they could have
proved beyond reasonable doubt that I did
this because there was no evidence—there
is absolutely nothing . . . . Obviously, I
think I would win, but the whole “what if I
don’t.” What if I don’t, then I’m dead.
Because I’ve never been through the courts
before. I’ve never been to the jail before, so
I didn’t know anything. I had no idea what
was going on, like I’m just sitting there not
knowing if I’m going to get out and not
knowing if I needed to see the judge or what
was going on. And so, then that’s when I’m
just like well I just want to take the plea. I
just want to get out of here. I guess there
was another plea and I didn’t understand
the other one. I guess like I know that’s not
why, like you’re not supposed to take a plea
to get out of jail. Like you can’t do it I guess,
but I would say that’s pretty much what I
did just because I wanted it done with—so
I could move on. I guess I just kind of
misunderstood.
(male,
white,
misdemeanor)
I didn’t want to take the plea. I said, “No.
I don’t want to.” But now when it gets all
the way to this point and I got out and I got
all my jobs back. Fuck it. Now I got out I
might as well take it and get it over with.
[489]
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When I was in jail I said, let’s do something
right now. But no. Nobody wanted to do
nothing. But they gave me this opportunity
to get out and . . . I don’t want to take it to
trial now. (female, black, felony)
C. Perceptions of the Plea Outcome as Fair
Given the findings associated with defendant
decisions to accept a plea of guilty, it is compelling to
consider whether defendants perceive the outcomes and
procedures of their case as fair. Table 3 provides
information on the association between defendant
characteristics and the indicators of procedural fairness,
outcome fairness, and case participation. Over 60 percent
of defendants interviewed for this study expressed
positive perceptions of the procedures and outcomes of
their case while 72 percent expressed negative
perceptions of their ability to participate in their case.
Defendants charged with both felony and lesser charges
articulated positive perceptions of the plea process (62
percent) and outcome (62 percent and 81 percent,
respectively). Those individuals whose cases were
dismissed overwhelmingly agreed that the court process
and outcome was fair (100 percent); only one defendant
whose case was dismissed felt that he did not have input
in the process. Defendants who received a disposition
other than dismissal were still most likely to express
positive perceptions of the plea process (between 50 and
64 percent), but overwhelmingly expressed concern about
their ability to participate in the procedures and
outcomes of their case (between 66 and 92 percent).
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Table 3. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining
Process is Fair Outcome is Fair Participation
Total

Yes
27

No
13

Yes
28

No
12

Yes
11

No
29

(67.5%)

(32.5%)

(70.0%)

(30.0%)

(27.5%)

(72.5%)

Gender
Male
Female

23

8

24

7

11

20

(74.2%)

(25.8%)

(77.4%)

(22.6%)

(35.5%)

(64.5%)

---

(100.0%)

4

5

4

5

(44.4%)

(55.6%)

(44.4%)

(55.6%)

9

Race
White
African
American
Other

9

4

8

5

2

11

(69.2%)

(30.8%)

(61.5%)

(38.5%)

(15.4%)

(84.6%)

16

8

18

6

8

16

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(75.0%)

(25.0%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

2

1

2

1

1

2

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

Charge
Misdemeanor
and Gross
Felony

10

6

13

3

7

9

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(81.3%)

(18.7%)

(43.7%)

(56.3%)

17

7

15

9

4

20

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(16.7%)

(83.3%)

6

---

6

---

5

1

(100.0%)

(83.3%)

(16.7%)

Disposition
Dismissed

(100.0%)

Convicted

Stay of Imposition

9

5

10

4

3

9

(64.2%)

(35.7%)

(71.4%)

(28.6%)

(20.0%)

(80.0%)

3

3

3

3

2

4

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

Continued
9

5

9

5

1

13

(64.2%)

(37.5%)

(64.2%)

(35.8%)

(7.1%)

(92.9%)
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Table 4. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by Process,
Outcome, and Participation
Process is
Outcome is
Fair
Fair
Participation
Yes
27
(67.5
%)

No
13
(32.5%
)

Yes
28
(70.0
%)

No
12
(30.0
%)

Yes
11
(27.5%
)

No
29
(72.5
%)

Y

--

--

25
(89.3
%)

2
(16.7
%)

11
(100.0
%)

16
(55.2
%)

N

--

--

3
(10.7
%)

10
(83.3
%)

0

13
(44.8
%)

Y

25
(92.5
%)

3
(23.0%
)

--

--

11
(100.0
%)

17
(58.6
%)

N

2
(7.5%
)

10
(77.0%
)

--

--

--

12
(41.4
%)

Y

11
(40.7
%)

0

11
(39.3
%)

0

--

--

N

16
(59.3
%)

13
(100.0
%)

17
(60.7
%)

12
(100
%)

--

--

Total

Procedure is
Fair

Outcome is
Fair

Participation

The two factors that were most strongly
associated with defendant perceptions of outcome
fairness was the belief that the outcome received was a
“good break” or that the outcome was “deserved.” This
result supports our finding that defendants weigh
considerations of blameworthiness and uncertainty
avoidance when deciding to accept a plea of guilty. It is
also supported by theories of distributive justice and
prior research on outcome satisfaction. For example,
Casper found that the majority of male defendants
describe their sentence as fair, and that perceptions of
outcome fairness was based on the belief that the
[492]
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sentence receives was less severe than was anticipated—
or at least the “going rate”—and appropriate to the
crime.47 Defendants interviewed for this study
articulated similar perceptions:
Yeah, I’m happy with the outcome. I was
really happy. I was hoping for what I was
offered, so I pretty much got what I was
expecting. (female, white, felony)
I thought that that they were going to put
me on some type of probation for a certain
amount of time where I would have to keep
coming back to my probation officer. A lot
of other things like that, you know, for like
six months or something, and I won’t be
able to get my driver’s license until I’m 21
or something, that’s what I thought was
going to happen. You know, so it was much
of a relief when they said—when she said
she might be able to switch it over to a
disorderly conduct. Since I had already
been in jail for two days and the police
officer maced me, I have had enough
punishment I guess. So I was really
relieved when that happened. I’m glad I
didn’t have to pay no ticket. That would
have been even worse. . . . At the end of the
day I’m happy with my outcome, yeah.
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Defendants—both those who were interviewed
and those whose cases were observed—who openly
discussed their guilt perceived the plea process as a
means to obtain an outcome that they felt they deserved.
In this sense, defendants who indicated satisfaction with
47

Casper, supra note 13.
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their outcome adopted a just deserts approach to their
outcome.48 As one defendant put it, “you do the crime, you
do the time.” Another defendant charged with three
felony counts of theft stated that he was “happy” with his
court experience:
Because of the outcomes that I received . . .
I face consequences for what I did and if I
wouldn’t have faced anything, if they had
just said, “Okay you can go on with your
business. Don’t ever do that again,” I never
would have learned from my mistakes. So I
believe that justice was served in my case. I
deserved my consequences. I have to take
part in what I did, pay for what I did.
(male, white, felony)
Particularly in DWI and property cases where
evidence is easily obtained through breathalyzers, blood
tests, video surveillance, and fingerprinting, the question
that loomed over defendants was not whether they would
take their case to trial to dispute guilt, but what plea offer
they would receive from the prosecutor. One defendant
who was ultimately convicted of felony check fraud
recounts, “Basically the deal that I got—there’s no other
better way that you could have ever put it, you know
what I mean? I didn’t have to go to jail and got the same
probation officer. To be honest with you, I probably
should have gotten a little bit worse punishment than I
did considering the fact of what I did.”

See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1987);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF
INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976).
48
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D. Perceptions of the Plea Process as Fair
Over 90 percent of the defendants who were
interviewed for this study and who perceived their
outcome as fair also perceived the court process leading
to their outcome as fair. A defining measure of procedural
fairness in this study was whether defendants felt that
they were treated the same as other defendants, and
whether they felt fairly treated by the public defender—
conclusions arrived at by observing other cases and
talking to other indigent defendants. In most cases, the
considerable amount of waiting time required for a
defendant’s case to be called allows plenty of
opportunities to talk and mingle with other indigent
defendants in hallways, elevators, and smoking areas.
These interactions offer defendants a way to “blow off
steam” and “kill time,” but it also provides them with
information about others’ experiences, which they use to
assess their own situation. As one defendant stated after
stepping out of court, “They treat everyone the same, so
yeah, I would consider it fair, or fair enough.”
For this same reason, however, some defendants
perceive their treatment as unfair. In these cases,
defendants articulated concern that their case was being
handled the same as all other cases and not given
individual consideration. Defendants expressed concern
that they never had a conversation with their public
defender before pleading guilty and did not understand
the plea process that resulted in their outcome. One
defendant who was charged with a felony count of
property theft indicated that he was satisfied with his
outcome but dissatisfied with the process:
No, I don’t feel that I was treated fairly
going through the process, but, I mean,
what choice did I have. . . . He [the public
defender] never communicated with me.
Maybe he did do something, but I don’t
[495]
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know what he did. He never told me
anything. I was on my own. He said, “here
is what’s going to happen. This is your case,
so you go over here, go over there. Now you
just come back and go see the judge and
you’re on your way.” You know, and I’m like
“okay.” But, I mean, yes, I am happy with
the outcome. (male, black, felony)
This statement illustrates the frustration that
many defendants articulated about their public defender,
and how perception of public defenders’ behaviors can
influence defendant perceptions of fairness. Legal
scholars identify different and often competing
conceptions of the role of criminal defense lawyers;
however, most agree that zealous advocacy of defendants
is necessary and justified.49 The American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states that it is a lawyer’s responsibility to “represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law.”50 For
indigent defendants, perceptions of enthusiastic and
effective representation influence positive and negative
judgments of public defenders. Those who perceived their
public defender as an individual who is willing to fight
for their case—i.e., put time and effort into the case—
were most likely to talk positively about public defenders
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 158; Abbe
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life
and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2004); Margareth Etienne,
Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2103, 2104–05 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., An Essay on the
New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 92 (1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1993).
50 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1998).
49
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and feel as if they were fairly treated. As one incarcerated
black male stated, “I felt like she was great. She did
everything in her power, everything that she could
possibly do to give me the lesser charge possible or try to
get me out of it. She did everything that she could do. So
I felt she did her job really well.” Another white male
charged with felony theft stated:
Oh, I liked my public defender, she’s a great
attorney and I really appreciated her help.
I feel like she did a better job than other
public defenders I’ve ever had. It just
seemed like she had an actual knowledge of
the case, like she actually paid attention to
it. Most public defenders don’t even know
who you are until they look in your file
when they see you. She seemed like she
actually, you know, took the time and tried
to find out the best results and get
information. So, yeah, I was real
appreciative. I liked her, she was a good
person. (white, male, felony)
Defendants who perceived their public defender
as an individual who was not willing to fight for their case
were less likely to speak positively about their experience
with their legal representation and their court
experience:
Personally, to me, I want to have my own
lawyer next time. Pay my own lawyer,
‘cause I know if I got my own lawyer that
he’s gonna fight for me. The public defender
is not gonna fight for you. (black, male,
felony)
I think it’s just not fair, like the public
defenders are bullshit. Like you can call a
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real lawyer and he can get you less time,
but call a public defender and he can get
you the most time, you know what I’m
saying? Like if a public defender is
supposed to be a lawyer, right? So how
come they can’t act like the lawyer? It’s like
bullshit, you know. They’re supposed to try
their hardest. I bet you if somebody was
paying them, then they will try to go
harder, know what I mean? A lot of them
don’t care. They don’t care because they got
so many cases. They get paid for so many
cases, so they pretty much want to get you
in and get you out of their face. (black,
male, felony)
Research shows that the most common complaint
received by public defenders concerns the lack of time
and attention they give to defendants.51 Professional
conduct rules require that public defenders keep clients
informed of the status of their case and promptly respond
to client requests for information.52 The reality, however,
is that public defenders are often unable to comply with
professional duties because of circumstances that include
excessive caseloads and a failure to be appointed to a case
in a timely manner.53 When public defenders have too
Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and
Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public
Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 758–66 (2015); ROY B.
FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK
IN
CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); cf. THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95 (discussing the
inability of indigent defense attorneys to comply with their
professional duties due to, among other things, excessive
caseloads).
52 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1998).
53 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 22; THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95.
51
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many cases, client contact suffers and sometimes
becomes virtually non-existent. Defenders become
unavailable to defendants because they are constantly in
court, which often forces initial public defenderdefendant meetings to take place in the courtroom.
Yeah, like the only reason that I would not
have him to be my lawyer again is basically
because of the miscommunication that we
had. It’s not something that he did with my
case wrong or anything. It’s just that I feel
like if I call, if I call you two or three times
a week and you don’t return any of my calls
or give me any type of response, something’s
wrong with that. Either you’re just ignoring
me or you don’t really care about what’s
going on with my case. You just want to get
it over with. And, you know, he has a lot of
other clients too, but that’s no reason. With
Monday through Friday, there’s no reason
that out of those days that I can’t get a
response from you from calling you two or
three times a week. (white, male, felony)
The hardest part is getting a hold of the
public defender. I was trying to get a hold
of the public defender, but they never call
you back or talk with you or anything like
that. So until your date, your next court
date—that’s the first time I talked with my
public defender. And all they do is come out
and ask for a new court date because they
haven’t had a chance to look over the case
at all. (white, male, felony)
He talked with me one time and he told me
the offer, that’s it. (black, male, felony)
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I wasn’t treated fairly because being treated
fairly is when you’re honest with your client
and you put everything on the table and let
them know what’s going on. (black, female,
felony)
Research by Tom Tyler and colleagues suggests
that defendants are most likely to report positive
perceptions of court actors if they understand what
motivates their behavior and decision-making.54
Authorities who act unexpectedly are not necessarily
judged to be untrustworthy if people feel that they
understand why they behave in the manner in which
they do. Conversations with the defendants in this study
confirm this finding. As articulated in the previous
statements, defendants critique public defenders but also
provide justification for their behaviors. For example, one
black male who received a stayed sentence for a series of
misdemeanor violations indicated that he was
disappointed in his lawyer’s willingness to fight for a
better plea negotiation—“He was alright, but he could
have tugged a little harder to get it down a little more.”
The defendant followed this statement with the following
explanation for the defender’s behavior:
He was pressed for time ‘cause he got to be
here, he got to be there. You can’t get mad
at them because they are overloaded. You
know, if you want to keep it real, they are
all public defenders, pretenders, or
whatever. They are all overloaded. They get
TYLER, supra note 42; Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 129 (1998); Tyler,
supra note 25, at 70; Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond
Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural
Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
SETTINGS 78 (John S. Carroll ed., 1990).
54
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more and more every day. You know it’s a
wonder that all of them ain’t half crazy. It’s
not good. It’s not good. It’s not good. But,
that’s basically what it is, you know. It’s
bad because you—you ain’t have no faith in
the system, you know, ‘cause you ain’t got
nobody that’s gonna really fight for you.
Half of them can’t even negotiate on a plea
bargain, let alone on a trial. I guess that’s
probably even how they are taught in
college now-a-days, just to be a deal-maker.
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Another white female who received probation for
a misdemeanor indicated that she was concerned during
court because she expected to have more opportunities to
talk with her attorney, but also indicated that “there are
so many other cases and horrible things that happen,
that they can’t worry about [her].” Also, a black male who
was incarcerated for multiple misdemeanors stated,
Those public defenders, you can’t even talk
to them. It’s frustrating. You know that it’s
six or seven other people to this one person.
I mean like how many people can you
actually juggle by yourself? I thought
public defenders were supposed to be there
to help so why isn’t there more of them?
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Previous research indicates that defendants
express sentiments of distrust for public defenders.55 The
findings of this research, however, indicate that
defendants are not necessarily distrusting of public
defenders, but of the system that public defenders work
CASPER, supra note 24; Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender,
1 YALE REV. LAW SOC. ACTION 4, 6 (1971).
55
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for. Public defenders are perceived by defendants as part
of a larger system that prescribes their behavior.
I do not really feel like he was on my side.
I’ll be honest with you. Not really. I'm just
another, you know, pawn on the
chessboard. He's just doing his job. Just
get ‘em in, get ‘em out, get ‘em in, get ‘em
out, you know? It’s just a job with the
prosecutor. (male, black, misdemeanor)
When you’re incarcerated they call them
“public pretenders.” But, you know, it’s the
truth because you know the prosecutors and
the public defenders they eat lunch
together, they go fishing together, you know
they just hang out together, they’re friends.
You know, so while they’re like eating
ravioli, it’s probably like, “Oh what do you
want to do with him? Okay I’ll give you
him, just let me beat this case right here.”
You know what I’m saying? It’s like chess
and it’s kind of messed up. (male, black,
felony)
It’s not fair because they work for the city.
So, he started working with the prosecutors
and seeing what they want to come up with,
but he’s not asking the client what’s going
on. It’s not fair. It was all him, him and the
prosecutor. The public defender is not fair;
it’s not justice because they do what they
want to do. What them and the prosecutor
want to do. (male, black, felony)
Statements such as these suggest that defendants
do not necessarily view the behavior of public defenders
as representative of the defenders themselves, but rather
as a reflection of the circumstances of their position in the
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criminal courts, which relies heavily on the plea process
to ensure efficient case progress. Defendants did not
perceive public defenders as apathetic but overextended.
This account of the plea process parallels criticisms
among scholars who argue that the criminal process has
evolved into a system of assembly line justice which is
most concerned with processing cases as quickly and
efficiently as possible.56 For these reasons, many
defendants are not provided with contact information for
their public defenders and, if they are, are not able to
reach the public defender or receive a return phone call.
A defendant who was charged with driving with a
cancelled license for the fifth time explained this
experience:
Yeah, you know, it’s just like a process, like
a processing plant. They just process you,
like they processing cattle. They say, “Okay
this is what they gonna do for you: so, so,
so, so. Now if you don’t do this here, now the
charge carries: so, so, so, so. Now I can get
you this here. Right now, today, I can get
you so, so, so, and then you go to jail.” You
BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2; William Glaberson, Faltering
Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-deniedbronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html
[https://perma.cc/H3XX-FLA5]; William Galberson, Courts in
Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 14, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/nyregion/justice-deniedcourts-in-slow-motion-aided-by-defense.html
[https://perma.cc/8W8T-A5NQ]; Ari Shapiro, Report Calls Out
Flaws In Public Defender System, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Apr. 15,
2009),https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
103108229 [https://perma.cc/3CQP-EBH6]; Cara Tabachnick,
In the Public Defense, THE CRIME REPORT, (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/in-the-public-defense
[https://perma.cc/GRQ8-5Z64].
56
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know, it’s just a process. You know, they
don’t have time to deal with no one
individual, ‘cause they can’t put too much
time in ‘cause they got so many. Like I say,
it’s like, “Come on down, you’re the first
contestant in The Price is Right!” It’s like
Monty Hall in Let’s Make a Deal. (male,
black, misdemeanor)
As this defendant articulates, the plea process can
move rapidly. On days in which the court calendar is
full—such as after the weekend or a holiday—or, in
courts that see a particularly high volume of cases—such
as property and drug courts—cases can move so quickly
that there is not time for the defendant to meet or talk to
their public defender. In conversations with defendants
after their first appearance, defendants were often
unable to state the name of their public defender, or how
they may be able to reach the defender. As one black male
defendant charged with 5th degree drug possession
articulates:
The first time I went through it, I was
terrified. I didn’t know what was going on.
I felt like I was from Asia and it’s my third
day here in America and I didn’t have no
English classes or whatever, so I’m
speaking a whole different language. And
they’re just like talking a foreign language
and I’m like, “What’s going on? I need to
talk to my lawyer.” I’m like, “but look I
don’t understand, like, you know, hold up.”
I just felt ignorant, you know what I mean.
The first time, I’m like “oh my.” I learned
everything I know about the court system
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being inside the jail and not from being in
court, not from my lawyer, but by sitting
there listening and watching other cases.
(male, black, felony).
E. Perceptions of Participation and SelfExpression
Despite the finding that most defendants perceive
the outcomes and procedures of their case as fair, over 70
percent of defendants did not feel like that they had
adequately participated in their cases. Table 3 indicates
that over half of all defendants who reported that the
process and outcome of their case was fair also indicated
that they did not have enough input in their case. This
finding is somewhat surprising. As cited previously, the
extant literature on perceptions of fairness argue that
when defendants feel as if they are a part of the
procedures of their case and have adequate opportunities
to voice their side of the story, positive attitudes of the
fairness of the outcome and procedures of their case
increase.57 Empirical studies that consider the plea
process, however, provide contradictory accounts of the
effect of participation in plea bargaining on perceptions
of fairness. For example, some scholars argue that plea
bargaining provides more control and a heightened sense
of efficacy because defendants are actively participating
in their case by pleading guilty in return for an agreed
upon sentence.58 In this regard, the process of plea
bargaining can provide defendants with greater certainty
over their outcome, leading to more positive evaluations
LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 9; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 29.
58
Anne M. Heinz, Procedures Versus Consequences:
Experimental Evidence of Preferences for Procedural and
Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EMERGING JUSTICE (Susette M. Talarico, ed., 1985).
57
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of their process. Casper argues that in cases when
defendants receive an outcome that is not expected, they
are more likely to articulate limited participation in their
case and perceive the process as less fair.59 The findings
of our research also indicate that defendants who were
caught off-guard by the decisions of the court were more
likely to express negative attitudes. One defendant
charged with 2nd degree assault describes her experience
of receiving a more severe sentence than she anticipated:
No, we didn’t talk a lot. I left him [public
defender] a few messages, spoke to him on
the phone and asked him, you know
different questions about where I was
going. He said jail time was out of the
picture. I knew for a fact that jail time
wasn’t going to happen. I just knew that for
a fact that it was no jail time. And then on
the last day it’s jail time…it wasn’t an
honest way to come and tell me I was doing
jail time, to find out on the very last day
when I go to court that I’m going to get
sentenced to jail, and never heard it. Before
any conversation that we had, any
paperwork that I signed, he never said
anything. So then I come to court and
expect probation, monetary probation,
strict probation, or whatever and then have
to get locked up. I thought that was very
unfair because that was the first time I
heard of it before going into court. I just
wished he would have talked to me more
and prepared me a little bit more. When I
59

CASPER, supra note 24.
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expected no jail time and then when I got
jail time it was like, “oh well, you got jail
time.” It was like “case closed” for him. Like
I know he had to know ahead of time before
five minutes before court. So, oh well, I just
got to live with it and do my time I guess. I
would have felt good if I would have had a
chance to speak more and explain myself.
Then I would have been prepared for this,
but like I said, it all hit me like five minutes
before we went to court, so I wasn’t really
expecting that. And the judge, the judge
just agreed to everything that was going on
and did not take time to listen to my side.
So, I guess I get the shit end of the stick.
(female, white, felony)
In more serious felony cases, such as this one,
defendants are less likely to be certain of the outcome of
their plea agreement when they sign it. Unlike
misdemeanor cases, in which most cases are settled on
the first or second day in court, felony cases can be
extended for over a year (as in this case), and often
involve pre-plea agreements. In cases in which pre-pleas
are signed, the defendants admit their guilt and consent
to an interview and evaluation by probation that
presumably guides the decision of the judge. In most
cases, public defenders promote pre-plea evaluations as
an opportunity to decrease defendant sentences because
they offer the judge and other court members a more
thorough understanding of the defendant’s history and
the situation surrounding the case. However, defendants
often become frustrated after reading these reports
because they do not feel as if the probation officer
adequately represents them—most articulated concern
that the report contained negative information that was
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not reported by the defendant, such as drug and alcohol
use.
Differences in procedures between felony and
misdemeanor cases may understandably influence the
experience of defendants. Table 5 reports defendant
perceptions of procedures, outcomes, and case
participation by case severity. These results indicate that
the most prevalent difference between individuals
charged with felonies and less severe charges is the
association that defendants draw between having a voice
and fair procedures and outcomes. Individuals who are
charged with felonies, compared to those who are charged
with less severe offenses, are less likely to indicate that
they adequately participated in their case (16 percent
compared to 43 percent) and less likely to associate their
participation with procedural and outcome fairness. Only
23 percent of felony defendants agreed that they
participated in procedures that they experienced as fair
(compared to 70 percent of misdemeanor/gross
misdemeanor defendants); 26 percent agreed that they
had participated in outcomes they perceived as fair
(compared to 53 percent of misdemeanor/gross
misdemeanor defendants). Prior examinations of the
relationship between case severity and court experiences
suggests that case severity can influence defendants’
interest in their case, particularly when the outcomes are
more severe.60 This research provides support for such
claims. Defendants in this study who were charged with
lower-level offenses were more likely to express apathy
towards the procedures and outcome of their case. For
example, when asked whether defendants would prefer
more opportunities to be involved in their case, one
Hispanic male charged with a misdemeanor count of
contempt of court responded that the courts can “do what
they want.” When we subsequently asked if he felt that
he was treated with respect, he indicated that he “has
never really thought about it.” Statements such as these
60

Heinz, supra note 58.
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by defendants support observed differences in
misdemeanor and felony courts. Defendants in
misdemeanor courts more frequently “blow-off” court
dates. They plead guilty without talking with their public
defender about options other than the original plea
offered by the state. Defendants charged with
misdemeanors are also more likely to arrive to court
alone without family or friends, whereas in felony
courtrooms, family members, friends, and caseworkers
provide a regular show of support, concern, and input
into defendant decision-making.
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Table 5. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by
Process, Outcome, Satisfaction, and Charge Level
Outcome is
Process is Fair
Fair
Participation
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Misdemean
10
6
13
3
7
9
or and
(62.5%) (37.5%) (81.3%) (18.7%) (43.7%) (56.3%)
Gross
Procedure is Y
Fair
N

Outcome is
Fair

Y
N

Participation Y
N

Felony

--

--

--

10
0
7
3
(76.9%)
(100.0%) (33.3%)
3
3
0
6
(23.1%) (100.0%
(66.7%)
)

10
3
(100.0%) (50.0%)
0

3
(50.0%)

--

--

--

--

7
0
7
0
(70.0%)
(53.8%)
3
6
6
3
(30.0%) (100.0%) (46.1%) (100.0%
)

7
6
(100.00% (66.7%)
)
0
3
(33.3%)
--

--

--

--

17
7
15
9
4
20
(62.5%) (37.5%) (62.5%) (37.5%) (16.7%) (83.3%)

Procedure is Y
Fair
N
Outcome is
Fair

--

--

--

--

--

Y

15
(88.2%)

0

N

2
7
(11.8%) (100.0%)

Participation Y
N

15
2
4
13
(100.0%) (22.2%) (100.0%) (65.0%)
0
7
0
7
(77.8%)
(35.0%)
--

--

--

--

4
0
4
0
(23.5%)
(26.7%)
13
7
11
9
(76.4%) (100.0%) (73.3%) (100.0%
)

4
11
(100.00% (55.0%)
)
0
9
(45.0%)
--

--

--

--
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IX. Conclusion
Research indicates that the majority of
individuals charged with a crime plead guilty. This study
focuses on why defendants decide to plead guilty versus
take their case to trial and their perceptions of the plea
process and outcomes. Our findings suggest that
defendants decide to plead guilty, regardless of
innocence, because the process provides the quickest
pathway out of court and with little risk. The decision to
enter a plea of guilty is also influenced by confusion over
court processes and outcomes, and fear of what may
happen if the defendant does not accept a plea deal.
While outcomes associated with plea bargaining are
considered by defendants to be by and large fair—
primarily because the outcome was expected and
perceived as comparable to the outcomes that others
receive—defendants do not always perceive the plea
process as fair. Dissatisfaction with the legal
representation and perceived lack of control and input in
the decisions of their case are key factors that influence
perceptions of procedural fairness and justice.
Scholars and legal practitioners often argue that
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty reflects their guilt
and a concern for taking responsibility for their
behaviors. The courts—particularly federal courts—have
supported the position that defendants should receive
leniency in exchange for accepting blame for their
actions.61 However, while defendant guilt may play a
mediating effect in defendant decision-making, the
findings of this research indicate that guilt has little
direct effect on the decision to plead guilty. Rather, the
efficiency that the plea process provides is a primary
influence on defendant decision-making. Many scholars
argue that as the number of individuals who intersect
with the courts increases, plea bargaining provides a
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009).
61
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quick, inexpensive way to handle growing dockets.62 The
findings of this research suggest that the plea bargaining
process is not only preferred by court actors, but also by
the defendants, who are also influenced by a desire to
“just get it over with.”
In addition to the time and money saved by
pleading guilty, defendants indicated that they preferred
the certainty of plea deals. Research shows that
defendants who decide to take their case to trial and are
found guilty frequently receive more severe sentences
than they would if they had pled guilty. Plea-trial
disparity research shows that some defendants receive a
sentence at trial that is up to ten times more severe than
defendants with similar charges and backgrounds who
decide to plead guilty.63 The results of this study echo
these findings, with defendants articulating concern for
the risk associated with taking their case to trial. Many
defendants felt as if they were receiving a “break” or a
See sources cited supra note 18.
See Brian D. Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guidelines
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46
CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); Nancy J. King et al., When Process
Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea,
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005); McCoy, supra note 22; Darrell
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’
Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (2001); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705
(2000); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging
Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination
in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001); Celesta A.
Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial
Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247 (1991); Gary D. LaFree,
Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of
Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985); Ruth D.
Peterson & John Hagan, Changing Conceptions of Race:
Towards an Account of Anomalous Findings of Sentencing
Research, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 56 (1984).
62
63
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“good deal” and were not willing to take the chance that
they may be acquitted or receive a more lenient sentence
from a judge or jury at trial.
An important finding of this research is the
influence that misunderstanding has on the decisionmaking process of defendants. The findings of this study
illustrate that defendants arrive at the decision to plead
guilty through a series of justifications that are
influenced by the strain of making a quick decision and a
lack of understanding about plea bargaining, court
procedures, and the implications of sentencing outcomes.
Although defendants’ decisions to plead guilty may be
adequately described by an efficiency or uncertainty
avoidance perspective, the final decision to accept a plea
is influenced by a combination of factors that include
guilt, time and financial concerns, and fear. These
considerations are mediated by a lack of understanding
of the legal procedures and language associated with the
court system.
Notably, this study is the first to examine plea
bargain decision-making through interviews with
defendants. In doing so, the findings advance our
understanding of how defendants arrive at the decision
to plead guilty and contribute to knowledge about
whether defendants perceive the plea process and
outcome as fair. Prior research argues that individuals
who perceive case proceedings as fair are more likely to
view outcomes as fair and report overall satisfaction with
their court experience.64 Also, procedures that provide
defendants with the opportunity to have a voice and
participate in the decisions made in their case are more
likely to feel fairly treated, respected, and valued by court
actors.65 In this study, however, most defendants did not
report a sense of participation in their case; yet, over twothirds of defendants perceived both the plea procedures
CASPER, supra note 24; Casper, supra note 13.
Christopher Campbell et al., supra note 51, at 759; Casper,
supra note 13.
64
65
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and outcome of their case as fair. In fact, most defendants
spoke positively about the outcomes of their case and
believed that they received sanctions that were deserved
and less severe than they had anticipated. Defendants
perceived their court experience as fair because it
mirrored other defendants’ experiences; for the most
part, defendants felt that they were all treated the same,
for the good and the bad.
Yet, defendants in this study did not necessarily
feel that they were treated well or fairly by their public
defenders. Defendants who expressed both positive and
negative perceptions of public defender behavior,
however, attributed the behavior to the social and
situational circumstances of the courts. Attribution
theories argue that people make distinctions between
persons and their social situations.66 Social attributions
occur when individual behavior is interpreted in terms of
situational forces and, particularly, when an individual
is a member of a group. For example, Vincent Yzerbyt
and Anouk Rogier argue that “social attribution is
especially likely to be at work when perceivers believe
that they are confronted with a clear social entity, a
coherent whole,” and that social attribution is “of
paramount importance for the rationalization and
justification function of stereotypes.”67 Defendants in this
study attributed the behaviors of public defenders to the
“system”—public defender behavior is therefore a
consequence of being a worker in “The Public Defender’s
Office” which is funded by “The State” or “The System.”
The legitimacy of public defenders as figures of authority
See generally Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89 (Daniel T. Gilbert,
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
67 Vincent Yzerbyt & Anouk Rogier, Blame It on the Group:
Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social Attribution, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 103, 105
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
66
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is contextualized by defendant beliefs about the court
system. Defendants viewed public defenders as acting
legitimately or, at the very least, consistently in this
social context—i.e., eager to plead defendants guilty,
disinclined to give them much time, and not concerned
about their welfare. In this regard, although defendants
do not trust the motives of public defenders—because
they are dictated by the system—they trust that they will
receive the legal representation of an overburdened
public defender.
Importantly, defendant attitudes toward the
procedures and outcome of their case are not necessarily
contingent on perceptions of fairness or trust of public
defenders. Defendants do not feel as if they receive fair
treatment or necessarily trust public defenders to
represent their best interests, but they express
satisfaction with the plea process and outcomes. Processbased models of regulation state that defendants who
lack confidence in their lawyer are not only likely to
harbor negative feelings about the law but are also more
likely to resist the lawyer’s and court’s advice regarding
the implications of future non-law-abiding behavior.68
Past research notes that defendants often lay full blame
for the faults of the system on their public defender.69 The
findings of this research, however, argue that defendants
contextualize the behaviors of their public defender.
Public defenders are criticized and often blamed by
defendants, but they are also seen as part of a larger
system that is out of both the public defender’s and the
defendant’s control. Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is questioned by defendants more so than
TYLER & HUO, supra note 31; Tyler, supra note 31, at 311;
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 31, at 515; Tyler & Wakslak,
supra note 31, at 259.
69 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85; Roy B. Flemming, Client
Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with
Criminal Clients, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 258 (1986);
Casper, supra note 55, at 6.
68
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the actual behaviors of public defenders and the
relationships they establish with defendants.
Defendant evaluations of the courts are also not
necessarily contingent on their experiences and
evaluations of law enforcement. Research consistently
finds that poor individuals, especially minorities,
embrace negative attitudes about police, which is based
on personal experiences and the experiences of others in
their community.70 Many scholars argue that legal
perspectives are created through interactions with law
enforcement; negative perceptions of police practices spill
over to other areas of the criminal justice and political
systems.71 Yet, this may not always be the case. In this
project, defendants spoke unexpectedly and at length
about police misconduct. Defendants complained first
and foremost about their treatment by police and the
fairness of the charges against them. This is to say that,
for the most part, defendants blamed law enforcement for
their status as a defendant in a criminal case and
subsequently viewed the courts as “just doing their job.”
This finding may be negative or positive depending on
how it is interpreted. On the one hand, defendants can
differentiate between criminal justice institutions, their
role in their criminal process, and their treatment by
criminal justice personnel, indicating that the legitimacy
of the criminal justice and political systems are not
necessarily always overshadowed by the actions of law
enforcement. On the other hand, this finding may
indicate that the poor may be so disillusioned by police
practices that they can only interpret court experiences
Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Accounting for Variation
in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 159–60 (2009);
Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 781; Weitzer & Tuch
(2002), supra note 37, at 442–43; Weitzer & Tuch (1999), supra
note 37, at 502; Scaglion & Condon, supra note 37, at 486, 489.
71 TYLER, supra note 42, at 95; Bobo & Thompson, supra note
32, at 447; Bobo & Johnson, supra note 38.
70
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as more positive than their experiences with the police.
In generalizing these findings to the total
population of defendants, we note that this research
relies only on adult criminal defendants located in a midsized Midwestern town. Defendants in smaller or larger
areas may have different court experiences. Sentencing
guidelines also vary by state, and, as the first state to
implement determinant sentencing, Minnesota may not
reflect the practices of states that still rely on
indeterminate sentencing practices. Sentencing rules
and guidelines may, in turn, significantly affect
defendant experiences and decisions. For example,
defendants in Hennepin County speak openly about
situating their decisions and experiences within the
boundaries of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines (i.e.
“the grid”). Therefore, while defendants may not feel
satisfied with their outcome, they feel fairly treated
because they assume that guidelines guarantee that
similar defendants receive similar outcomes.
At the same time, this research includes only
those defendants who are represented by a public
defender. Individuals represented by public defenders
are the largest and most socially disadvantaged
population of defendants in the criminal courts. Unlike
indigent defendants, affluent defendants may be more
likely to hire a private attorney and afford the costs of
childcare and time away from work, which defendants in
this study indicated as key considerations to accepting a
plea of guilty. More affluent individuals are also less
reliant on governmental assistance, which often
stipulates that an individual may not receive assistance
if they have a criminal conviction. Due to these
differences in circumstances, it is likely that the decisionmaking considerations and processes of defendants in
this research are different than the population of
defendants who are not represented by public defenders.
Despite the limitations of this research, the
implications are significant. This research shows that
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defendants plead guilty because they are confused,
scared, and feel coerced. Since plea bargaining was first
implemented over a century ago, scholars have argued
that the process creates a coercive atmosphere for
defendants—defendants feel that they have to plead
guilty or risk receiving a more severe sentence at trial,
even if they are innocent.72 The findings of this research
support this argument, with defendants expressing fear
of taking their case to trial. Even those defendants who
originally enter a plea of not guilty with the intention to
pursue a trial ultimately plead guilty out of fear that the
outcome at trial might result in more significant
consequences. While Minnesota does not have a strict
guideline rule that reduces sentences for those who plead
guilty, public defenders rely heavily on sentencing
guidelines and grids to illustrate minimum and
maximum sentences to defendants. Public defenders may
not insist that defendants take a plea bargain; however,
they do adamantly remind defendants that if they do not
accept a plea, they may go to trial and receive the
maximum sentence. In the most direct situations,
defenders openly inform defendants that the judge has
indicated that if they take the case to trial, that they will
be given the maximum sentence allowed by law.
Our findings also indicate that fairness is not
monolithic and can take on different meanings across
individuals who are accused of a crime. For example,
defendants in this study were most likely to associate the
even distribution of justice—outcomes and procedures—
with fairness. This finding is contrary to research by
Tyler and colleagues that found that defendants did not
define their experience based on their ability to
participate and have input in the procedures of their

Bowers, supra note 22, at 1120; McCoy, supra note 22, at 69;
Bibas, supra note 7, at 2531; Langbein, supra note 10, at 16
(citing People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Mich. Ct. App.
1968) (Levin, J., concurring)).
72

[518]
90

PLEADING GUILTY
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019)

case.73 Most frequently, defendants relied on the fair
application of the law in their case. This result is
particularly compelling when considered in light of
research showing disparity in arrests and sentencing
severity between black and white individuals and,
particularly, those charged with drug and property
offenses.74 This finding may be less surprising, however,
when we consider that the poor are far more likely to be
the subject of unfair and discriminatory treatment on a
daily basis and in their own communities. As Merry
argues, most lower-class Americans believe that society
is unfair, unjust, and that everyone’s rights are not
equally protected.75 Therefore, when poor defendants
receive unsatisfactory treatment from the courts, they
are not alienated—they are perhaps not even aware of
being treated unfairly—because the experience is similar
to experiences with other state actors and institutions.76
As some of the most socially marginalized individuals in
our society, poor defendants do not expect to have a voice
or to receive the same treatment as individuals with more
social status. They do not have the expectation that law
officials will give them and their story adequate
consideration, and they do not consider criminal courts
as a space in which their self-value and identity is
defined.
Perhaps the most important implication of this
73 LIND & TYLER,

supra note 27, at 216; Tyler & Bies, supra note
54, at 89.
74 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER THE LAW: RACE IN
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007); WESTERN, supra note 36, at 50.
75 Sally E. Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among WorkingClass Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 68–
69 (1985).
76 JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 181 (2011);
COLE, supra note 36, at 8; Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All
Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 374 (1990).
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research, therefore, is that criminal justice reforms are
needed to ensure the rights of indigent defendants. Once
indigent defendants are swept into the criminal courts,
they are required to navigate a system that they do not
understand. Defendants are required to make quick
decisions that have significant implications on their lives,
families, and communities; however, their decisions are
bounded by limited information and an incomplete
comprehension of the procedures and meanings of
sentences. Plea bargaining allows agents of the court to
move through cases quickly and rationalize that plea
bargains are fair because defendants make the decision
to plead guilty. This research shows that we should not
presume such a simplistic and idealistic conclusion.
Future research should consider how we can strengthen
the position of defendants by providing defendants access
to dispositional advisors, or staff that are available to
counsel defendants about their decision-making
processes. If courts are not capable of providing
defendants adequate representation and informed
decision-making, this research suggests that we need to
reconceptualize the meaning of “fairness” in the court
system.
Finally, this research speaks to the current state
of our criminal courts and their reliance on the plea
process. Over the past few decades, scholars have focused
on sentencing, incarceration, and the reentry of
prisoners, to the neglect of investigations into indigent
defense representation and the processes of criminal
courts. The lack of attention to and investment in
ensuring the rights of defendants and the quality of legal
representation is startling considering the continued
support for “tough on crime” policies that increase the
stakes for a staggering number of individuals whose lives
are affected by the courts. Yet, and in despite of these
changes, this research offers evidence that indicates that
defendant attitudes have remained relatively stable over
time. In particular, the results of this research
complement early studies of defendants. In the 1970s,
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Casper noted that not only did defendants speak
positively about the plea process, but that most
defendants preferred to “cop out” and accept a plea: “the
defendant doesn’t see himself as giving up anything of
great value: he is simply speaking words, and they don’t
seem to mean very much.”77 Although interactions with
the criminal justice system and the severity of sanctions
have increased, it does not appear to be the case that
defendant experiences or expectations of what the courts
can offer has changed much at all.
Future research and policy reforms should focus
attention to increasing defendants’ understanding of
their court experiences. We should also consider how
defendant attitudes towards the fairness of their
procedures and outcomes vary over time. As time passes,
defendants may learn new information about court
processes or experience the ramifications of their
disposition in different ways. Consequences of criminal
cases that have additional impacts over time may lead
people to reconsider their fairness evaluations. As one
defendant indicated, “At the time it was really about
being fair. I mean, I don’t really know looking back on it
if I consider it to be a fair deal. But at the time, it was
just kinda like . . . what I get is what I get type of thing.”
This research offers a unique and important
perspective of our courts. In doing so, it begs the question
whether we should be expecting more from our courts or
be satisfied to know that most defendants perceive their
treatment as “fair enough.” In many regards, it is
possible that most defendants cannot even conceptualize
what “justice” might look like in the court system, given
that the majority are represented by attorneys who are
overworked, underpaid, and have little time to give
adequate attention to each case. Given the infrequency of
trials, most defendants have no point of comparison to
the plea process. This is difficult to assess, but it is
77

CASPER, supra note 24, at 85.
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conceivable that if we increased our expectations of fair
treatment by law enforcement and other institutional
actors, the standards of court experiences would not be
set so low. This research asserts that most defendants are
satisfied with the procedures and outcomes of their cases,
but it does not imply that defendants perceive the court
system to care about their well-being or the implications
of court sanctions on their lives.
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termination of employment). VAMs are complicated
statistical models that attempt to estimate a teacher’s
contribution to student test scores, particularly those in
mathematics and reading. Educational researchers, as
well as many teachers and unions, however, have objected
to the use of VAMs noting that these models fail to
adequately account for variables outside of teachers’
control that contribute to a student’s education
performance. Subsequently, many teachers challenged the
use of VAMs through the courts. This article assesses those
challenges.
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I. Introduction
In March of 2017, William “Bill” Sanders passed
away in Tennessee.1 To most policymakers outside of
education (and many within it) he was a relatively
unknown statistician. His work in education policy
started far away from schoolhouses. Indeed, after he
received his degree in statistics at the University of
Tennessee, he began assessing the impact of radiation on
farm animals.2
But his career trajectory changed markedly. In
1982, after reading a newspaper article about how
Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander sought a model of
teacher compensation that would pay teachers for
performance, Mr. Sanders concluded he had the answer.3
He wrote to Alexander explaining that he developed a
statistical model that could determine who the “best”
teachers were—a so-called “value-added” model (e.g., the
Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS)
Kevin Carey, The Little-Known Statistician Who Taught Us
to Measure Teachers, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/upshot/the-little-knownstatistician-who-transformed-education.html [https://perma.
cc/2VBF-CZWY].
2 Id.
3 Id.
1
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which is more generally known as the Education ValueAdded Assessment (EVAAS)).4 This model estimates a
teacher’s contribution to student achievement on
standardized tests,5 and it formed the basis for his
private company that developed algorithms for the
models.6 Tennessee ultimately incorporated value added
models into policies and laws, linking high-stakes
employment decisions and evaluation to student test
scores.7
Mr. Sanders’s models—sparked by this random
collision of events—has had profound impact on national
educational policy. In 2009, President Obama’s Race to
the Top (RttT) program conditioned state receipt of
federal education dollars on states’ use of VAMs to
evaluate and make employment decisions for teachers.
States seeking much-needed federal money during the
Id. VAMs have a policy history that precede Mr. Sanders’s
adoption of the term in education. They had been used in
economics since the 1960s. See, e.g, Douglas Harris, Would
Accountability Based on Teacher Value Added Be Smart
Policy? An Examination of the Statistical Properties and Policy
Alternatives, 4 J. EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 319, 321 (2009). Yet
Sanders is widely credited as the one who popularized the use
of VAMs for educational accountability. E.g., Carey supra note
1.
5 E.g., EDWARD WILEY, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO VALUE
ADDED ASSESSMENT 5 (2006) https://nepc.colorado.edu/
publication/a-practitioners-guide-value-added-assessmenteducational-policy-studies-laboratory-resea [https://perma.cc/
EH6R-S7QN].
6
SAS® EVAAS® FOR K-12, https://www.sas.com/en_si/
software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/65TE-VEFG] (crediting
the development of this particular model sold by a private
company to Mr. Sanders).
7 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-302(a)(2)(C), 49-5-503(4) (2016);
TENN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., TEACHER AND ADMINISTRATOR
POLICY § 5.201 (2017) (statutory and regulatory framework
delegating authority to state department of education to
develop policy for evaluation and further linking that
evaluation to tenure determinations).
4
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“Great Recession” eagerly complied.8 As a consequence,
VAMs became codified in state teacher evaluation and
employment laws across the country.9
Despite their widespread adoption, the use of
these statistical models in improving public schools is a
source of considerable debate in law and policy. Some
scholars applaud their use, arguing that they provide a
clear measure of a teacher’s worth and address a
persistent policy dilemma: How to improve the quality of
our public school teachers.10 Detractors insist that a
teacher’s value is much more than the measure of test
scores and, more importantly, that VAMs are statistically
flawed.11 Critics note that VAMs fail to account for the
complexity of teaching and cannot accurately control for
the impact of other variables (e.g., students’ individual
See generally Rhoda Freelon et al., Overburdened and
Underfunded: California Public Schools Amidst the Great
Recession, 2 MULTIDISCIPLINARY J. EDUC. RES., 152 (2012)
(documenting the impact of the Great Recession on public
schools in California, but also noting the broader impact of the
recession on schools and institutions beyond California).
9 KATHRYN M. DOHERTY & SANDI JACOBS, STATE OF THE STATES
2013: CONNECT THE DOTS: USING EVALUATIONS OF TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS TO INFORM POLICY AND PRACTICE 10 (2013)
(noting that in 2013 at least 31 states had adopted the use of
standardized test in their teacher evaluation protocols); see
also MARK A. PAIGE, BUILDING A BETTER TEACHER:
UNDERSTANDING VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN THE LAW OF
TEACHER EVALUATION 15, 16 (2016) (describing the links
between teacher evaluation systems and teacher employment
statutes, such as tenure, and warning against such use for
high-stakes decisions).
10 See, e.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Conceptual and Empirical Issues
in the Estimation of Educational Production Functions, 14 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 351, 353 (arguing for the adoption of
production function models to evaluate teachers).
11 E.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, Can Value-Added Add Value
to Teacher Evaluation?, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 132, 133
(placing the use of value added models in the larger policy
debate about how to improve teacher quality).
8
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motivation) that impact student achievement.12 Because
of these issues, commentators cautioned against the use
of VAMs in high-stakes employment decisions (e.g.
termination), noting such use would invite legal action.13
Notwithstanding these warnings, many states
embraced VAMs. Florida, for example, amended their
teacher evaluation statutes to ensure that VAMs played
a controlling role in teacher employment status,
including tenure decisions.14 Teachers and unions almost
immediately challenged the use of VAMs through legal
means. Lawsuits ranged from violations of the Federal
Constitution15 to assertions that requirements to use
VAMs violated the non-delegability doctrine.16 Many of
these received widespread attention in the popular
press.17
Id.; see also SEAN P. CORCORAN, CAN TEACHERS BE
EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS’ TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY
BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED MEASURES OF TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 22 (2010).
13 PAIGE, supra note 9, at 22 n.28; see also Preston C. Green III
et al., The Legal and Policy Implication of Value-Added
Teacher Assessment Policies, 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 15–16
(2012).
14 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.22(1)(c)(5) (West 2013)
(connecting teacher salary to an evaluation system that
requires use of VAMs).
15 E.g., Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015)
(alleging use of VAMs violated substantive and procedural due
process clauses, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment).
16 E.g., State ex rel. Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194
(N.M. App. 2015).
17 E.g., Peter Greene, Over a Year Ago a Federal Court Struck
Down VAM: Why Are We Still Using it to Evaluate Teachers?,
FORBES (June 25, 2018, 08:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/petergreene/2018/06/25/over-a-year-ago-a-federal-courtstruck-down-vam-why-are-we-still-using-it-to-evaluate-teachers/
[https://perma.cc/AA4M-NRQ5]; Patricia MacGregor-Mendoza,
Court Finds Teacher Evaluation System Flawed, LAS CRUCES
SUN NEWS (May 26, 2017, 07:17 PM), https://www.lcsun12
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It has been almost ten years since Race to the Top
brought Mr. Sander’s idea of VAMs from Tennessee to a
national scale, and it seems an appropriate moment to
assess their legal and policy ramifications. Indeed, as we
note, the use of VAMs has triggered a wave of litigation
and policy change that continues today. Many states
continue to use VAMs, while others have reduced their
use under new federal laws.18 Thus, assessing the legal
and policy landscape forms the basis of this article.
Generally speaking, three lines of legal challenges
have emerged. First, some are grounded in the
substantive Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment, arguing that the laws do
not pass rational basis scrutiny.19 Second, a line of cases
challenges the authority or jurisdiction of a particular
agency (e.g., state Department of Education) to enact
evaluation regulations or laws that use VAMs. Third,
some cases advance what we refer to as “process”
arguments. These contend that the use of VAMs violates
some agreed-upon or standing procedural terms found in
the Procedural Due Process Clause or collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs). As we note, plaintiffs
have captured the most success (although not always) on
this third line of argument.
That litigants have experienced more success
arguing VAMs offend certain procedural protections
comports with common understanding of procedural due
news.com/story/opinion/2017/05/26/court-finds-teacherevaluation-system-flawed/102219102/ [https://perma.cc/ESS8SXWX];Valerie Strauss, Judge Calls Evaluation of N.Y.
Teacher “Arbitrary” and “Capricious” in Case Against New U.S.
Secretary of Education, WASH. POST (May 10, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/
2016/05/10/judge-calls-evaluation-of-n-y-teacher-arbitraryand-capricious-in-case-against-new-u-s-secretary-ofeducation/ [https://perma.cc/Y645-2T82].
18 See infra Part III.
19 See, e.g., Cook, 792 F.3d at 1298, 1300.
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process. At its core, procedural due process ensures
“fundamental fairness” when the government moves to
take away a protected interest, such as employment.
While courts generally have not overruled a legislature’s
policy choice to use VAMs as violative of the substantive
due process, they (including a federal appeals court case)
have questioned the wisdom of the legislature’s
decision.20 Where they have overturned the use of VAMs,
they have done so on procedural grounds.21 This allows
courts to stay within “their lane” and avoid jurisdictional
overreach into the policy area.
The article is organized as follows. Part I
overviews VAMs, their link to teacher evaluation and
employment, and the controversy surrounding their use,
especially as a factor in high-stakes employment
decisions. Part II provides the most current assessment
of cases where the statistical controversy has led to legal
action. Part III discusses the recent policy and legal
developments with respect the use of VAMs in evaluation
that have occurred because changes in federal education
law. In conclusion, we note that VAMs have receded,
somewhat, in terms of their role in evaluation and
employment matters.
II. VAMs: Promise and Controversy
A. A Brief History of VAMs in Educational
Policy
In the simplest of terms, VAMs (e.g., Tennessee’s
TVAAS) are statistical models used to measure the
predicted and the actual “value” a teacher “adds” to (or
detracts from) student achievement from the point at
which students enter a teacher’s classroom to the point
students leave. This is typically done using student
20
21

See id. at 1301.
See id. at 1301–02.
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achievement growth as measured by large-scale
standardized test scores (i.e., the tests mandated by the
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001). The models
attempt to statistically control for outside variables,
including students’ prior test performance, and studentlevel background variables (e.g., whether students are
eligible for free-and-reduced lunches).22
The most widely used VAM is the EVAAS,
developed and used in Tennessee.23 EVAAS comes in
different versions for different states (e.g., the EVAAS in
Ohio, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the PVAAS in
Pennsylvania, the TVAAS in Tennessee, and the
TxVAAS in Texas) and different ones based on large and
small school districts (e.g., located within Arkansas,
Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and Virginia). For each
consumer, EVAAS modelers choose one of two
sophisticated statistical models.24
Using these models, student growth scores are
aggregated at the teacher or classroom level to yield
teacher-level value-added estimates. Depending on where
See e.g., Sean Corcoran & Dan Goldhaber, Value Added and
Its Uses: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit, 8 EDUC.
FIN. & POL’Y 418, 421 (2013). Other variables include things
such as, English language learners (ELLs), gifted, receiving
special education services, and classroom and school-level
variables (e.g., class sizes, school resources, school leadership).
23 The EVAAS is advertised as “the most comprehensive
reporting package of value-added metrics available in the
educational market” in that the EVAAS offers states, districts,
and schools “precise, reliable and unbiased results that go far
beyond what other simplistic [value-added] models found in the
market today can provide.” SAS® EVAAS ® FOR K-12,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/software/evaas.html [https://perma.cc/
76AY-G47W].
24 For a comprehensive statistical summation of the various
models and options available, see WHITE PAPER: SAS®
EVAAS® FOR K12 STATISTICAL MODELS, https://www.sas.
com/content/dam/SAS/en_us/doc/whitepaper1/sas-evaas-k12statistical-models-107411.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5EW-WCB6].
22
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teachers’ EVAAS estimates fall, as compared to similar
teachers to whom they are compared (e.g., within
districts) at the same time, teachers’ value-added
determinations are made.25 Thereafter, EVAAS modelers
make relativistic comparisons and rank teachers
hierarchically along a continuum.26 Teachers whose
students grow significantly more than the average and/or
surpass projected levels of growth are identified as
“adding value”; teachers whose students grow
significantly less and/or fall short of projected levels are
identified as “detracting value.”27 Teachers whose
students grow at rates that are not statistically different
from average (i.e., falling within one standard deviation
of the mean) are classified as Not Detectibly Different
(NDD).28
1. The Rise of VAMs in National Education
Policy: Race to the Top
In 2007, TVAAS/EVAAS entered the national
education policy discussion when developer Dr. William
L. Sanders shared his research with Congress.
Specifically, he testified before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Education and the
Workforce on how TVAAS could improve teacher

For a general overview of the use of VAMs and the concepts
noted herein, see WILEY, supra note 5.
26 Id.
27 Id.; Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Clarin Collins, The SAS
Education Value-Added Assessment System (SAS® EVAAS®)
in the Houston Independent School District (HISD): Intended
and Unintended Consequences, 20 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS
ARCHIVES, no. 12, Apr. 2012, at 1, 7 n.2.
28 WILEY, supra note 5; Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, supra
note 27, at 7 n.2; see, e.g., WILLIAM L. SANDERS, COMPARISONS
AMONG VARIOUS EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT VALUE-ADDED
MODELS 18 (2006).
25

[532]
104

TENNESSEE’S NATIONAL IMPACT
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 523 (2019)

accountability and promote educational reform.29 His
testimony spurred the U.S. Department of Education’s
piloting of VAMs.30
The use of VAMs nationally grew under the Race
to the Top program. By way of background, RttT was a
competitive federal grant program that amounted to an
injection of $4.35 billion to selected states to support
educational reform efforts.31 Receipt of the grant was
conditioned on states developing teacher evaluation laws
and policy that used VAMs.32 States that attached
relatively more serious consequences (e.g., employment
status) to teachers’ VAM-based output were viewed more
favorably than those that did not.33 High-stakes
consequences included, but were not limited to: teachers’
permanent files being flagged, thus preventing teachers
from changing jobs within states; the revocation of
teacher licenses; teacher tenure; salary increases,
decreases, and merit pay; and teacher probation and
termination.34
Beyond RttT, the federal government used other
mechanisms to embed VAMs in state evaluation and
employment matters as a matter of law and policy. In
2011, the federal government required that states adopt
the
accountability
practices
discussed
above
CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON & JANELLE BARLAGE, INFLUENCE:
A STUDY OF THE FACTORS SHAPING EDUCATION POLICY 41
(2016), https://secure.edweek.org/media/influence_study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/346S-HJSX].
30 Id.
31 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP FACT SHEET (2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35GG-Y3HM].
32 Id.
33 Arne Duncan, Sec’y, Dep’t of Educ., Remarks at The Race to
the Top Program Announcement: The Race to the Top Begins
(July 4, 2009), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/race-top-begins
[https://perma.cc/3RD5-RP7A].
34 See generally PAIGE, supra note 9 (noting that VAMs became
required factors for employment decisions).
29
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(notwithstanding if a state applied or received RttT
funds) to secure waivers from the penalties that they
would incur for non-compliance with the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001.35 NCLB, passed with bipartisan
support in 2001, required 100 percent of students to
attain proficiency in math and reading state
standardized tests.36 The utopian goal has been widely
criticized as impractical.37 Nevertheless, the federal
government required states to submit waivers to escape
the punitive measures of non-compliance (e.g.,
intervention of state authorities in the operation of local
schools). More specifically, these waivers buttressed the
core policy drivers of RttT by continuing to incorporate
student test scores as a means to hold teachers
accountable for their “value added,” or lack thereof.38
The cumulative impact of RttT and federal
waivers on the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations was
substantial. By 2014, 40 states and Washington, D.C.,
KEVIN CLOSE ET AL., STATE-LEVEL ASSESSMENTS AND
TEACHER EVALUATION SYSTEMS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: SOME STEPS IN THE RIGHT
DIRECTION 5 (Nat’l Educ. Policy Ctr. ed., 2018),
https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PB%20C
lose-Beardsley-Collins_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG4N-B8N2].
36 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, §
1001, 115 Stat. 1425 (requiring all students obtain proficiency
in specified test areas) (repealed 2015).
37 See, e.g., Bruce Meredith & Mark A. Paige, Opinion,
Rethinking Federal Role in Education Makes Sense. Trump’s
Plan Does Not, ATLANTA J.-CONST.: GET SCHOOLED (Oct. 3,
2018, 11:15 AM) https://www.myajc.com/blog/get-schooled/
opinion-rethinking-fed-education-role-makes-sense-trump-plandoes-not/T19cWlKAznnDpcoxmvr1nJ/
[https://perma.cc/S3J4B4FW] (characterizing the NCLB goal of proficiency as
unrealistic, especially in light of the lack of support from the
federal government to education and other important public
policy areas that impact education success, like housing and
health care).
38 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 8.
35
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(80%) were using or still developing some type of VAM for
increased teacher accountability purposes.39 While state
department of education leaders recognized and
encouraged the use of VAMs, they did not develop
support mechanisms and resources to help teachers
understand and subsequently use their VAM-based data
to improve their effectiveness.40 Put differently,
information from VAMs was not actionable. This
disconnect has been the source of serious contention and
concern about the VAM-based teacher and educational
reform enterprise.
B. Statistical and Practical Controversies
Significant statistical and practical concerns
surround VAMs, and these are best understood with
reference to the professional guidelines that govern
education and psychological professions, the Standards
for Educational and Psychological Testing41 (hereinafter
“Standards”). These issues include, but are not limited to:
(1) reliability, (2) validity, (3) bias, (4) transparency, and
(5) fairness, with emphasis also on (6) whether VAMs are
being used to make consequential decisions using
concrete (e.g., not arbitrary) evidence, and (7) unintended
consequences. These are discussed below.
1. Reliability
Reliability is the degree to which test- or
measurement-based scores “are consistent over repeated
applications of a measurement procedure (e.g., a VAM)
and hence and inferred to be dependable and consistent”
Id.
Id. at 14.
41 AM. EDUC. RESEARCH ASS’N, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N &
NAT’L COUNCIL ON MEASUREMENT IN EDUC., STANDARDS FOR
EDUCATIONAL
AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING
(2014)
[hereinafter STANDARDS].
39
40
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for the individuals (e.g., teachers) to whom the scores
pertain.42 VAMs are reliable when within-group (same
school or district) VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness
are more or less consistent over time, from one year to
the next, regardless of the type of students and subject
areas teachers teach. Consistency over time is typically
captured using particular statistical tools such as
standard errors, reliability coefficients per se, and
generalizability coefficients, among others.43 These
situate and make explicit VAM estimates and their
(sometimes sizeable) errors and, importantly, help others
understand the errors that come along with VAM
estimates.
Research has documented serious concerns with
respect to VAM reliability (or intemporal stability).
Indeed, teachers classified as “effective” one year might
have a 25–59% chance of being classified as “ineffective”
the next year, or vice versa, with other permutations
possible.44 If a teacher who is classified as a “strong”
teacher this year is classified as a “weak” teacher next
year, and vice versa, this casts doubt on the reliability of
VAMs for the purpose of identifying and making highstakes decisions regarding teachers. Accordingly, across
VAM, reliability is a hindrance, especially when
unreliable measures are to be used for consequential
purposes like decisions to terminate or deny tenure.

Id. at 222–23.
Id. at 33.
44 For a comprehensive overview of these concepts, see José
Felipe Martínez et al., Approaches for Combining Multiple
Measures of Teacher Performance: Reliability, Validity, and
Implications for Evaluation Policy, 38 EDUC. EVALUATION &
POL’Y ANALYSIS 738-56 (2016); see also Peter Z. Schochet &
Hanley S. Chiang, What are Error Rates for Classifying
Teacher and School Performance Using Value-Added Models?,
38 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 142-71 (2013).
42
43
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2. Validity
Validity is “the degree to which evidence and
theory support the interpretations of test scores for [the]
proposed uses of tests.”45 It is measured by “the degree to
which all the accumulated evidence supports the
intended interpretation of [the test-based] scores for
[their] proposed use[s].”46 Put another way, validity asks:
Does the model assess what it is supposed to assess?47
Accordingly, one must be able to support validity
arguments with quantitative or qualitative evidence that
the data derived allows for accurate inferences.
There are various means to assess validity, but of
particular focus for researchers is validity as it concerns
“concurrent-related evidences.”48 This helps to assess, for
example, whether teachers who post large and small
STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 11.
Id. at 14.
47 There are sub areas of validity that have been the subject of
considerable research as it relates to VAMs.
These are: (1) content-related evidence of validity; (2)
concurrent-related evidence of validity; (3) predictive-related
evidence of validity; and (4) consequence-related evidence of
validity. See Michael T. Kane, Validating the Interpretations
and Uses of Test Scores, 50 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 1, 2, 8
(2013); see generally Samuel Messick, Validity, 3 J. EDUC.
MEASUREMENT 1, 8–103 (1989). However, while all these
evidences of validity help to support construct-related evidence
of validity, in VAM research most researchers rely on
gathering concurrent-related evidence of validity.
48 E.g., Edward Sloat, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley & Jessica
Holloway, Different Teacher-Level Effectiveness Estimates,
Different Results: Inter-Model Concordance Across Six
Generalized Value-Added Models (VAMs), 30 EDUC.
ASSESSMENT EVALUATION & ACCOUNTABILITY 367, 372 (2018);
see also Pam Grossman et al., The Test Matters: The
Relationship Between Classroom Observation Scores and
Teacher Value Added on Multiple Types of Assessment, 43
EDUC. RESEARCHER 293, 293-303 (2014).
45
46
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value-added gains or losses over time are the same
teachers deemed effective or ineffective, respectively,
over the same period using other independent
quantitative and qualitative measures of teacher
effectiveness. Other measures might include supervisors’
observational scores. If all measures line up and
theoretically validate one another, then confidence in
them as independent measures increases.49 If all
indicators point in different directions, something may be
wrong with either or both indicators (the VAM tool or
observational scores, or both).50
Researchers have questioned whether measures
of teacher value-added are substantively related to at
least one other criterion of teacher effectiveness (e.g.,
teacher observational or student survey indicators).51
Moreover, they question whether the concurrent-related
evidence of validity that does exist is strong or
substantive enough to warrant valid inference-making.
3. Bias
Bias pertains to the validity of the inferences that
stakeholders draw from test-based scores.52 Specific to
Kane, supra note 47, at 6–8, 37, 40, 64.
Id.
51 E.g., Morgan S. Polikoff & Andrew C. Porter, Instructional
Alignment as a Measure of Teaching Quality, 36 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 399, 399–401 (2014); Tanner
LeBaron Wallace, Benjamin Kelcey & Erik Ruzek, What Can
Student Perception Surveys Tell Us About Teaching?
Empirically Testing the Underlying Structure of the Tripod
Student Perception Survey, 53 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1834, 1835,
1837–38 (2016).
52 The Standards define bias as follows: as the “construct
underrepresentation of construct-irrelevant components of test
scores that differentially affect the performance of different
groups of test takers and consequently the . . . validity of
interpretations and uses of their test scores.” STANDARDS,
supra note 41, at 216. Biased estimates, also known as
49
50
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VAMs, unpredictable characteristics (variables outside of
the control of a teacher or school) of students can bias
estimates about teachers’ contributions. Student
characteristics include: students’ individual motivation,
capability to learn, and levels of academic achievement.53
Because schools do not randomly assign teachers, these
variables are not controlled in a way to mitigate bias.54
Biased results are quite possible, especially when
relatively homogeneous sets of students (e.g., English
Language Learners (ELLs), gifted and special education
students, or free-or-reduced lunch eligible students) are
non-randomly concentrated into schools, purposefully
placed into classrooms, or both.
Statistical models—even the most sophisticated—
cannot control for such bias.55 One influential study
illustrated VAM-based bias when it found that a
systematic error as concerning “[t]he systematic over- or
under-prediction of criterion performance” are observed when
said criterion performance varies for “people belonging to
groups differentiated by characteristics not relevant to the
criterion performance” of measurement. STANDARDS, supra
note 41, at 216, 222.
53 See generally Noelle A. Paufler & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley,
The Random Assignment of Students into Elementary
Classrooms: Implications for Value-Added Analyses and
Interpretations, 51 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 328, 328–62 (2014).
54 See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, & Jacob L.
Vigdor, Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of
Teacher Effectiveness, J. HUM. RESOURCES 778, 779–82 (2006)
(noting the various ways teachers are assigned to schools).
Class assignments in schools are historically a function of a
host of factors, including: pressure from parents for particular
class placement and pressure from teachers for placement of
particular students, especially those who may tend to be
considered “high-achieving.” Id. at 781. Additionally,
placement among schools within a district is similarly subject
to other variables, such as housing patterns. Id.
55 See, e.g., Paufler & Amrein-Beardsley, supra note 53, at
335.
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student’s 5th grade teacher was a better predictor of a
student’s 4th grade growth than was the student’s 4th
grade teacher.56 The absurdity of that finding raises
serious questions about the ability of VAMs to control for
bias. Notwithstanding, the primary debate raging across
articles concerns whether statistically controlling for
potential bias by using complex statistical approaches to
account for non-random student assignment makes bias
negligible, or rather “strongly ignorable.”57
4. Transparency
Transparency is defined as the extent to which
something is accessible and understandable.58 In terms
of VAMs, this relates to the extent to which VAM-based
estimates may not make sense to those receiving the
information. In education, teachers and principals may
not understand the models being used to evaluate their
performance. Because of this, they are generally unlikely
to use the VAM-generated information for formative
purposes (i.e., as a tool to gather information and change
practice as soon as possible).59 Practitioners often

Jesse Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value-added
Estimation: Selection and Observables and Unobservables, 4
EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 537, 546–47 (2009); Jesse Rothstein,
Teacher Quality in Educational Production, Q.J. ECON. 175,
210 (2010).
57 Sean Reardon & Stephen Raudenbush, Assumptions of
Value-Added Models for Estimating School Effects, 4 EDUC.
FIN. & POL’Y 492, 496–97 (2009).
58 STANDARDS, supra note 44.
59 Jonathan M. Eckert & Joan Dabrowski, Should Value-Added
Measures Be Used for Performance Pay?, KAPPAN, May 2010,
at 88, 89–90; Rachel Gabriel & Jessica Nina Lester, Sentinels
Guarding the Grail: Value-Added Measurement and the Quest
for Education Reform, 21 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1,
1–30 (2013); Ellen Goldring et al., Make Room Value Added:
Principals’ Human Capital Decisions and the Emergence of
56
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describe value-add data reports as confusing, not
comprehensive in terms of the key concepts and
objectives taught, ambiguous regarding teachers’ efforts
at both the student and composite levels, and often
received months after students leave teachers’
classrooms.
For example, teachers in Houston, Texas,
expressed that they are learning little about what they
did effectively or how they might use their value-added
data to improve their instruction.60 Teachers in North
Carolina reported that they were “weakly to moderately”
familiar with their value-added data.61 Tennessee
teachers maintained that there was very limited support
or explanation helping teachers use their value-added
data to improve upon their practice.62
Quite apart from the statistical concerns noted
above, the “black-box” nature of VAMs raises additional
questions in the field. Indeed, the purported strength of
VAMs is that they will improve instruction by providing
a wealth of positive diagnostic information. The models
are supposed to give practitioners useful, actionable
information. Yet, if practitioners have problems
understanding the models, the value (if you will) of VAMs
is greatly diminished. Unfortunately, statisticians that
have developed the models make “no apologies for the

Teacher Observation Data, 44 EDUC. RESEARCHER 96, 96–97
(2015).
60 Clarin Collins, Houston, We Have a Problem: Teachers Find
No Value in the SAS Education Value-Added Assessment
System, 22 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 4, 15, 22 (2014).
61 Kim Kappler Hewitt, Educator Evaluation Policy That
Incorporates EVAAS Value-Added Measures: Undermined
Intentions and Exacerbated Inequities, 23 EDUC. POL’Y
ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 11 (2015).
62 See Eckert & Dabrowski, supra note 59, at 90.
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fact that [their] methods [are] too complex for most of the
teachers whose jobs depended on them to understand.”63
5. Fairness
General questions of fairness have been raised
concerning the use of VAMs, especially in the context of
high-stakes employment decisions. Fairness is the
impartiality of “test score interpretations for intended
use(s) for individuals from all relevant subgroups.”64 But
issues of fairness arise when a test or test use impacts
some more than others in unfair or prejudiced, yet often
consequential ways.65
Fairness issues are amplified as VAMs are
applied in the field. Indeed, VAMs are generally only
directly applicable to teachers who instruct in areas that
are subjected to standardized tests (typically, math and
reading).66 States and districts can only produce VAMbased estimates for approximately 30–40% of all
teachers.67 The other 60–70%, which sometimes includes
entire campuses of teachers (e.g., early elementary and
high school teachers) or teachers who do not teach the
core subject areas assessed using large-scale
standardized
tests
(e.g.,
mathematics
and
English/language arts), cannot be evaluated or held
accountable using teacher-level value-added data.68
Importantly, when districts use this information to make
Carey, supra note 1, at 13; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra
note 59, at 20.
64 STANDARDS, supra note 41, at 219 (emphasis added).
65 This concern is consistent with the general argument of this
paper. To wit, courts have sustained objections to the use of
VAMs where they violate procedural due process, the basic
“fundamental fairness.” See Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294,
1301 (11th Cir. 2015).
66 E.g., Green et al., supra note 13 (noting that the models only
apply to 30–40% of teachers).
67 Id.; see also Gabriel & Lester, supra note 59, at 7.
68 Green et al., supra note 13, at 15, 27–28.
63
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consequential, high-stakes employment decisions the
unfairness can have considerable consequences. Some
teachers in certain grades or subject areas experience the
negative or positive consequences of these VAM-based
data more than their colleagues.69
6. Consequential Use
Assessing the appropriate use of tests must
consider the social and ethical concerns70 in addition to
more sterile concerns about statistical methodology.71
The Standards recommend ongoing evaluation of both
the intended and unintended consequences of any test as
an essential part of any test-based system, including
those based upon VAMs.72
Typically, ongoing evaluation of social and ethical
consequences rests on the shoulders of the governmental
bodies that mandate such test-based policies.73 In this
case, local and state education departments would be the
agencies in charge of assessing the social costs and
ethical issues associated with the use of VAMs in highstakes contexts. This is because they “provide resources
for a continuing program of research and for
dissemination of research findings concerning both the

This has formed the basis of substantive due process claims
against school districts. E.g., Cook, 792 F.3d 1294 (agreeing
that the system of Florida that adopted VAM ratings that apply
to all teachers, including those in non-tested subject areas, was
unwise and unfair but upholding it under rational basis test).
70 E.g., Messick, supra note 47, at 8 noting that “[t]he only form
of validity evidence [typically] bypassed or neglected in these
traditional formulations is that which bears on the social
consequences of test interpretation and use.”
71 See also Kane, supra note 47.
72 STANDARDS, supra note 41.
73 Id.
69
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positive and the negative effects of the testing
program.”74
However, this rarely occurs. The burden typically
rests on the research community who must provide
evidence about the positive and negative effects and
explain these effects to external constituencies, including
policymakers. This group must collectively determine
whether VAM use, given the consequences and issues
identified above, warrant the financial, time, and human
resource investments.75 Local and state departments of
education typically have not (perhaps for political
reasons) acknowledged or sought to examine the
consequences of their policy actions.
7. Intended Consequences
As noted, the primary intended consequence of
VAM use is to improve teaching and help teachers (and
schools/districts) become better at educating students by
measuring and then holding teachers accountable for
their effects on students. The stronger the consequences,
the stronger the motivation leading to stronger intended
effects. Secondary intended consequences include
Position Statement on High-Stakes Testing in Pre-K–12
Education, AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N (2000), http://www.aera.
net/About-AERA/AERA-Rules-Policies/Association-Policies/
Position-Statement-on-High-Stakes-Testing [https://perma.cc/
969R-8RMR]; see also STANDARDS, supra note 41.
75 Arguably, some “reformers” assume that their ideas are
inviolable and opposition is simply a reflection of a recalcitrant
system, at best, or teachers’ unions at worst. See e.g., Michelle
Rhee, Opting Out of Standardized Tests? Wrong Answer,
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/michelle-rhee-opting-out-of-standardized-tests-wronganswer/2014/04/04/37a6e6a8-b8f9-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_
story.html [https://perma.cc/JD5L-6APK] (suggesting that an
organization she founded always keeps students’ interests first
and also implying that teachers’ unions do not, especially in
regards to the use of standardized tests).
74
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replacing the nation’s antiquated teacher evaluation
systems which have been criticized by all corners of the
education research.76
Yet, in practice, research evidence supporting
whether VAM use has led to these intended consequences
is suspect. Indeed, numerous studies have noted that
there is a lack of evidence linking VAMs to improved
teacher quality. First, VAM estimates have not produced
useable information for teachers about how teachers,
schools, and states might improve upon their instruction,
or how all involved might collectively improve student
learning and achievement over time.77 Likewise, recent
evidence suggests the use of VAMs has not led to
improvements in teacher evaluation systems.78 In sum,
strong evidence suggest that VAMs have not promoted
the intended benefits of providing actionable information
for teachers to improve instruction or teacher evaluation
systems.
8. Unintended Consequences
Simultaneously, ethical and research standards
require that the use of testing data must also recognize
VAMs’ unintended consequences.79 Policymakers must
present evidence on whether VAMs cause unintended
effects and if those effects outweigh their intended
impact. This means that the educative goals at issue (e.g.,
increased student learning and achievement) should be
See, e.g., DANIEL WEISBERG ET AL., THE WIDGET EFFECT
(2009) (criticizing the evaluation models that treat teachers as
“widgets” and fail to recognize their differences and value).
77 Henry Braun, The Value in Value-Added Depends on the
Ecology, 44 EDUC. RES. 2 (2015); Corcoran, supra note 12.
78 Matthew A. Kraft & Allison Gilmour, Revisiting the Widget
Effect: Teacher Evaluation Reforms and the Distribution of
Teacher Effectiveness, 46 EDUC. RES. 234–49 (2017).
79 See AM. EDUC. RES. ASS’N, supra note 74; STANDARDS, supra
note 41.
76
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examined alongside the positive and negative
implications for both the science and ethics of using
VAMs in practice.80
Researchers have produced an exhaustive list of
these unintended consequences.81 First, the use of VAMs
leads to teacher isolation whereby teachers “literally or
figuratively ‘close their classroom door’ and revert to
working alone.”82 Sadly, teacher isolation is at crosspurposes with collaboration among colleagues,
something that is an essential part to improving
schools.83 Second, the use of high-stakes testing causes
teachers to leave the profession and avoid high-needs
schools that most need the best teachers.84 Because of the
very nature of VAM-based teacher evaluation which
rewards testing achievement, teachers avoid teaching
high-needs students. This is rational: if they perceive
themselves to be at greater risk of teaching students who
may be more likely to hinder their value-added85 they
“seek safer [grade level, subject area, classroom, or
school] assignments, where they can avoid the risk of low
VAMS scores.”86 Of course, the flip side of this, teachers
avoid challenging assignments or leave the profession all
together.87 Third, and most troubling perhaps, is the
dehumanization that high-stakes testing causes. Indeed,
under such regimes, teachers view and react to students
as “potential score increasers or score compressors,” not
children.88

Messick, supra note 47.
See, e.g., Susan Moore Johnson, Will VAMS Reinforce the
Walls of the Egg-Crate School?, 44 EDUC. RES. 117–26 (2015).
82 Id. at 120.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32.
80
81
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III. The Cases
This section discusses cases where the central
issue was the role VAMs played in adverse employment
actions. It first traces those cases related to arguments
grounded in the substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. It then
highlights the series of cases where plaintiffs challenged
the use of VAMs on jurisdictional grounds (i.e., that a
particular government agency superseded its authority
or other statutes in requiring the use of VAMs). The final
subsection assesses the cases where process arguments
have been advanced by the plaintiffs.
A. Federal Substantive Due Process Rights &
Equal Protection Arguments: VAMs May Be
Unwise But Still Constitutional
1. Cook v. Bennett
In 2015, a group of teachers challenged Florida’s
use of student test scores to evaluate their job
performance.89 As part of that state’s application for Race
to the Top funds, the state legislature enacted a new
teacher performance evaluation regimen in their law of
teacher evaluation.90 Specifically, the legislature
required that at least 50% of a teacher’s performance
evaluation be based on student growth on state
standardized tests in math and English (the Florida
Comprehensive Assessment Test, or FCAT).91 The
remaining portion of the teacher’s evaluation was

Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.34 (West 2011).
91 Id. A teacher’s final evaluation was based on the student test
growth (the VAM rating) on the FCAT (50%) and a VAM rating
based on the school’s contribution to a student’s growth. Cook,
792 F.3d at 1297.
89
90

[547]
119

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

calculated based on a school-wide VAM rating.92 Not all
students take the math and English tests. In fact,
students took the English FCAT exam in grades 3
through 10 and the mathematics FCAT exam in grades 3
through 8.
Under the evaluation law, Florida teachers fell
under one of three types of categories.93 “Type A” teachers
were those that taught the tested subjects (math and
English) in the years that the FCAT was administered
for those subjects. In effect, as the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals noted, the model adopted by the state
education commissioner only worked as designed in
evaluating teachers of English in grades 4 through 10
and math in grades 4 through 8.94 The rest of Florida’s
public school teachers fell into two groups. “Type B”
teachers taught students in grades 4 through 10, but in
subjects other than English or math.95 “Type C” teachers
taught students in grades below 4 or above 10 or their
students did not take standardized tests (e.g., art).96
The thrust of the legal problem, according to the
teachers challenging the evaluation scheme, related to
the evaluation of Type B and C teachers. As a practical
matter, school districts evaluated Type B teachers using
student FCAT scores for math and English,
notwithstanding the fact that those teachers did not
instruct the students in those subjects.97 Type C teachers’
VAM scores were calculated based on school-wide FCAT
scores derived from student scores in subjects they did
not teach.98 Under this scenario, for example, a second
Id.
The district court designated the classification set forth in
this discussion and, for ease of reference, the appeals court
adopted it in its analysis.
94 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1298.
92
93
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grade art teacher’s VAM rating could be calculated based
on a 3rd grade student’s math and English test growth.
The plaintiff-teachers argued that the evaluation
laws violated the Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.99
Because no fundamental right was at issue, the court
applied the rational basis test to determine whether the
government’s actions had a legitimate purpose and
whether the chosen methods were rationally related to
that purpose.100 Ultimately, the court sided with the
government, finding that there was a legitimate interest
which was to “increas[e] student academic performance
by improving the quality of instructional, administrative,
and supervisory services in the public schools of the
state.”101
The court also concluded that there was a rational
relationship between this purpose and the use of the
FCAT VAMs.102 The court concluded—and the plaintiffs
conceded at oral argument—that the government “could
have reasonably believed that (1) a teacher can improve
student performance through his or her presence in a
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in relevant part, that: “No
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
100 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1300 (citing Fresenius Med. Care
Holdings, Inc. v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2013);
FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1993)).
101 Id. at 1301 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1012.34(1)(a) (2013)); see also
Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch.
Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1182 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (concluding
that plaintiff’s substantive due process claims failed because
“[e]ven accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face value, the loose
constitutional standard of rationality allows governments to
use blunt tools which may produce only marginal results.”).
The Houston court, however, ruled that the plaintiff’s
allegations of procedural due process violations survived
summary judgment dismissal. Id. at 1183.
102 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301.
99
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school and (2) the FCAT VAM can measure those schoolwide performance improvements, even if the model was
not designed to do so.”103 To be sure, both the appellate
and district courts criticized the chosen model.104
The court similarly applied the rational basis
review to dismiss the equal protection claims.105 Under
this claim, the teachers argued that the evaluation law
created a separate class of teachers: “those whose
evaluations are based on student growth data for
students assigned to the teacher in the subjects taught
by the teacher, and those whose evaluations are based on
student growth data for students and/or subjects they do
not teach.”106 However, because this classification did not
implicate a suspect class (e.g., race, gender) rational basis
applied and, under the same line of reasoning of the
substantive due process claim, the equal protection claim
was dismissed.107

Id.
Id. at 1301 (noting that “[w]hile the FCAT VAM may not be
the best method—or may even be a poor one—for achieving this
goal, it is still rational to think that the challenged evaluation
procedures would advance the government's stated purpose.”).
The district court in finding for the government concluded, in
dicta, that “[t]he unfairness of the evaluation system as
implemented is not lost on this Court” and that “this Court
would be hard-pressed to find anyone who would find this
evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let alone be
willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.” Cook v.
Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1215–16 (N.D. Fla. 2014), aff’d
sub nom. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
105 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301.
106 Stewart, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1213.
107 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1301 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (internal citations
omitted)).
103
104
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2. Trout v. Knox County Board of Education
Plaintiff teachers in Trout v. Knox County Board
of Education brought substantive and procedural due
process claims based on their evaluations that used
VAMs for purposes of teacher evaluations.108 In Trout,
the teachers challenged the use of Tennessee’s VAM
rating (the EVAAS). Specifically, two teachers (one a
math teacher and the other a science teacher) were
denied bonuses based on their VAM rating.109
Both teachers involved (Trout and Taylor,
respectively) argued that the use of the VAMs was
arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, could not be
sustained under the rational basis test. Echoing
criticisms of the reliability and validity of VAMs,110 the
plaintiffs argued that the VAMs were too imprecise to be
used to assess their effectiveness111 and therefore
violated substantive due process rights.
The federal district court ruled in favor of the
government. It began its analysis by noting that the
plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process
claim.112 By way of background, a substantive due
process claim requires that there be some property
interest at stake. Here, under an analysis of property
interest rights in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have an
interest in bonuses.113
For sake of argument, however, the court went on
to apply the rational test and found that the
government’s use of the VAMs in this case satisfied that

Trout v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 163 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494
(E.D. Tenn. 2016).
109 Id.
110 See supra Part I.
111 Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 500.
112 Id.
113 Id at 501.
108
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test.114 The use of VAMs to identify and support
instruction to lead to increased student achievement was
not in dispute as a legitimate government interest.115 The
plaintiffs, similar to Cook v. Bennett,116 argued that
various statistical infirmities made reliance on VAMs
irrational, however.117 In rejecting these arguments, the
district court noted, among other things, that there was
no legal authority requiring the court to apply a standard
with respect to the confidence level of a test.118
To be sure, the Trout court was sympathetic to the
plaintiffs’
complaints
regarding
the
statistical
119
inadequacy of the VAMs. Yet, at bottom, there was no
legal authority that required the court to apply a certain
level of statistical confidence with respect to the
government’s chosen method for purposes of measuring
teacher effectiveness.120

Id.
Id. at 503.
116 Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297.
117 For example, the plaintiffs took issue with the confidence
level of the statistical test (68%). Trout, 163 F.Supp. 3d at 503.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 504 (writing that the Court notes that Plaintiffs'
criticisms of the statistical methods of TVAAS are not
unfounded.)
120 Id. at 504–05. The court wrote that while “[p]laintiffs
bemoan the statistical imprecision of TVAAS,” no legal
authority “support[s] the proposition that the United States
Constitution requires legislative decision making regarding
the use of statistics to require ‘statistically significant’ results.
Absent controlling authority to the contrary, this Court refuses
to extend the rational basis test this far—where no suspect
class or fundamental right is at issue, the Constitution
requires a rational basis, not a statistically significant basis,
for the law in question.” Id.
114
115
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3. Wagner v. Haslam
Another set of teachers in Tennessee challenged
the use of VAMs in Wagner v. Haslam.121 Pursuant to
state and district evaluation policies, teachers of nontested subjects were evaluated based on school wide data
of student performance on test subjects.122 Similar to
Cook v. Bennett, the teachers claimed that this practice
violated the substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.123
The federal court, however, echoing the decisions
of other federal courts assessing similar claims, rejected
the teachers’ arguments. With respect to the substantive
due process claim, the court enumerated several reasons
why the policies at issue passed constitutional muster. It
noted that “the State Board could rationally believe that
a school-wide score provides some measure (albeit a crude
one)
of
evaluating
an
individual
teacher’s
performance.”124 The court also added that the legislature
had continued to amend its teacher evaluation laws to
address some of the concerns raised by the plaintiffs.125
While the Wagner court concluded that the use of
VAMs was constitutional, it expressed concerns over
fairness similar to those found in Cook and Trout. Indeed,
the Wagner court wrote that although the current
evaluation processes may produce “unfair results” for
certain teachers, it did not rise to the level of being
irrational.126 At the same time, the court was explicit
about its use of judicial restraint, especially with respect
to education policy questions. Indeed, subject to limited

112 F. Supp. 3d 673 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
Id.
123 See Cook, 792 F.3d at 1297.
124 Wagner, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 694 (emphasis added).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 695.
121
122
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exceptions,127 the states have “unfettered”128 discretion to
regulate education, and state legislators can make both
“excellent decisions and terrible decisions,” so long as
there is some “modicum of rationality.”129 Put another
way, a court may disagree with the policy choice of a
governing body, but it is not the role of the courts to
second-guess policy judgments of elected officials.130
4. Matter of Lederman v. King
The one extant case that succeeded in
demonstrating the government’s use of VAMs rose to the
high bar of arbitrary and capricious is found in Matter of
Lederman v. King.131 In this case, a well-regarded
veteran teacher who had previously had positive
evaluations received an “ineffective” review under New
York’s new evaluation system.132 This new system
required the use of VAMs. The teacher, Sheryl
Lederman, submitted “overwhelming” and ample
evidence from experts in the field that the court
concluded satisfied her burden in the record before the
court.133
In contrast, the court noted that state defendants
left numerous statistical issues unaddressed, including
the potential VAM biases against teachers with high-

Some exceptions, of course, would include the use of race to
segregate schools. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
483 (1954).
128 Id. at 692.
129 Id. at 693.
130 But see PAIGE, supra note 9 (arguing that for scholars of
educational policy the appropriate question is determining
which institutions—courts, legislatures, or markets—have the
capacity to best address a particular policy need in education,
like teacher evaluation).
131 Lederman v. King, 54 Misc. 3d 886 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
132 Id. at 888.
133 Id. at 897–98.
127
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performing students.134Critically, how Mrs. Lederman’s
scores swung so wildly from the second-highest level of
effective all the way to the lowest level of ineffective in a
single year with statistically similar scoring students,
among others.135 In sum, the court was constrained to the
record before it and, on that evidence, found Ms.
Lederman satisfied her burden.136
B. Legislative
Questioned

State

Agency

Authority

Litigants have also challenged the use of VAMs in
teacher evaluation on jurisdictional grounds. In these
cases, organizations (typically unions) have argued that
a legislative or executive agency exceeded their
respective authority in requiring VAMs for purposes of
evaluation or high-stakes employment decisions. These
cases are discussed below.
1. Leff v. Clark County School District
At issue in Leff v. Clark County School District
was the constitutionality of changes made to state laws
governing teacher evaluation and post-probationary (or
continuing contract) status.137 By way of background, up
until 2011, a teacher who completed a probationary
period of employment (three years) and was subsequently
rehired by a school district received post-probationary
status.138 Post-probationary status conferred to a teacher
certain procedural protections should they face
termination and required that termination be “for

Id.
Id.
136 Id. at 898.
137 Leff v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 210 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1244–
45 (D. Nev. 2016).
138 Id. at 1245.
134
135
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cause.”139 In contrast, probationary teachers could be
non-renewed without cause and did not have similar
procedural protections.
In 2011, the Nevada legislature changed its
teacher evaluation and post-probationary statutes. In
particular, it required that VAMs be used as part of
teacher evaluations. The legislature also required that if
a post-probationary teacher achieved two negative
evaluations, they would revert back to probationary
teacher status.140 Put another way, a teacher could lose
the protections (e.g., a teacher’s termination could only
be for “cause”) because of the changes to the state
statutes.
Teachers contested the changes based on the
federal Constitution’s Contracts Clause.141 That clause,
in relevant part, reads as follows: “No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts[.]”142 In essence, the post-probationary
teachers claimed that they had a binding contract with
the state once they achieved post-probationary status. In
exchange for meeting the demands of satisfactory
performance, the state had agreed to give them
procedural protections and the only grounds for
termination were cause. By passing the 2011 amendment
that tied teacher contract status to teacher evaluations
(that incorporated VAMs), the state breached the
contract, something not permitted under the U.S.
Constitution.
The federal court declined to adopt the teachers’
position and held that the statute prior to 2011 did not
create a contractual obligation between the state and
teachers. In its analysis, the court determined that there
is a strong presumption in law against the idea that a

Id.
Id.
141 Id. at 1244.
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
139
140
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legislative action creates a private contract.143 Absent
any expression of the legislature that they were creating
a contract, it is generally assumed that typical legislative
activity simply reflects a policy determination that can be
changed.144 Accordingly, the teachers’ claim that the
state legislature exceeded its authority with the
statutory amendments failed.
2. Stapleton v. Skandera
In Stapleton v. Skandera, teachers challenged the
use of VAMs in teacher evaluation on several
jurisdictional grounds related to statutory and agency
authority.145 By way of brief background, the New Mexico
legislature attempted—but failed—to make several
amendments to its existing teacher evaluation laws in
2012. Notwithstanding this, the New Mexico Department
of Education Secretary (through the Department)
promulgated new regulations relative to the evaluation
of teachers.146 The teachers sought judicial relief in that
the court would suspend the use of the regulations.147
The teachers argued that the Secretary exceeded
her authority—that, in effect, she acted in a legislative
capacity. They raised particular objection to the
incorporation of VAMs in teacher evaluation, arguing
that such a move could only be done by way of legislative
action because it represented a shift in public policy
under exclusive legislative purview.148 However, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals sided with the Department on
Leff, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 1246–47 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
465–66.)
144 Id.
145 Stapleton v. Skandera, 346 P.3d 1191, 1194 (N.M. App.
2015).
146 Id. at 1193 (citing N.M. CODE R. § 6.69.8).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1194.
143
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this issue. It noted that the enabling statute required
only that the Department enact evaluation regulations
that were “uniform statewide” and “highly objective.”149
Accordingly, the legislature left the Secretary “broad
authority” to enact regulations reflecting these
requirements and, in the view of the court, including
VAMs in teacher evaluation protocol did not exceed her
authority.150
The teachers in Stapleton raised other claims
related to agency authority. In particular, they raised two
additional objections. They contended the new
departmental
regulations
permitted
“assistant
principals” to observe teachers which violated the state
evaluation law that only gave such authority to
“principals.”151 Similarly, they argued that the provisions
in the regulations that exempted charter schools from
coverage of the evaluations violated the state law
requirement that the Department enact a system of
“uniform” evaluation.152
The court of appeals rejected both of the
arguments. With respect to the first claim (that only
principals could observe teachers), the court read the
state statute as allowing others to observe teachers,
including assistant principals. The court wrote, “We
agree with the district court that the regulation does not
necessarily conflict with the statute because the statute
‘mandates the participation of school principals [but]
does not limit the persons who may [also] observe
[teachers].’”153 Regarding the claim that the regulations
inappropriately exempted charter schools, the state court
of appeals noted that the state Charter School Act
specifically allowed the Department to waive certain

Id. at 1195 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(A) (1978)).
Id.
151 Id. at 1196.
152 Id.
153 Id. (alterations in original).
149
150
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regulations normally applicable to public schools.154
Because the teachers could not cite to any other legal
authority that suggested the waiver was not permitted
under the Charter School Act, this theory was also
rejected.155
3. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State
In Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, a
teacher’s union challenged Louisiana’s enactment,
amendment, and repeal of multiple state laws related to
public education, including those related to teacher
evaluation requirements.156 During the 2012 legislative
sessions, the state legislature amended and re-enacted
nine different statutes, enacted two new distinct
statutes, and repealed twenty-eight statutes all related
to education.157
The plaintiffs alleged that these actions, which all
occurred through one legislative act, violated the state
constitution’s “single object” requirement.158 That
requirement stipulates that the legislature enacts bills
that have “one object” and that various pieces of a bill
must have a relationship to one another.159 The teachers
argued that the bill contained unrelated subjects, such as
the changes to teacher evaluation, reduction in force
issues, rules governing contracts with superintendents,
among others.160
Louisiana’s supreme court rejected the plaintiffs’
arguments.161 The court began its assessment by noting
Id.
Id. at 1196–97.
156 La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 171 So. 3d 835, 841 (La.
2014).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 838.
159 Id. at 841.
160 Id. at 842.
161 Id. at 851.
154
155
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that there is a general presumption that a legislature’s
acts satisfy the “one object” rule.162 It also noted that the
purpose of the rule was to prevent “logrolling,” or the
practice of packaging many measures into one bill
because any of those measures, alone, would not pass the
legislature.163 The court noted that under such a “grave
and palpable” scenario, the legislature would violate the
single object rule.164 Yet, in this case, the court concluded
that the object of the act at issue “is improving
elementary and secondary education through tenure
reform and performance standards based on
effectiveness.”165 The court concluded that various
components of that bill could be broadly related to this
objective.166
4. Robinson v. Stewart
Another Florida case, Robinson v. Stewart,167 also
involved a challenge to the authority of the state Board
of Education to implement teacher evaluation
regulations using VAMs.168 In Robinson, the plaintiffs
sought to declare the 2011 Student Success Act
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impermissibly
delegated legislative control over public education to the
executive branch.169 The act revised teacher evaluation
procedures and required the use of “student learning
growth measures” (or VAMs) to evaluate teachers and
make significant employment decisions, such as
tenure.170 The act left it to the Department of Education
Id. at 845.
Id. at 845–46.
164 Id. at 851.
165 Id. at 850.
166 Id.
167 161 So. 3d 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
168Id.at 590–91.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 591.
162
163
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Commissioner (the executive branch) to develop the
formula to achieve these goals171 and required the use of
standardized test scores.172
The Florida District Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that the legislature, in requiring the
Commissioner to develop the formula, violated the nondelagability doctrine of the state constitution that
ensures a separation of powers.173 Its analysis noted that
the plaintiffs carried a high burden of proof: that the
legislature’s action violated the doctrine “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the highest standard of proof under
the law.174 The court further interpreted the act as simply
requiring the Commissioner to provide technical
implementation support, as opposed to allowing the
executive to make policy determinations.175
5. Filed but not Adjudicated
Another case that deserves some attention as it
also related to a claim that a state agency exceeded its
authority by incorporating VAMs in evaluating teachers.
In Texas Teachers Association v. Texas Education Agency,
the Texas Department of Education adopted teacher

Id.
Id. at 592.
173 Id. at 590–91.
174 Id. at 591.
175 Id. at 592. But see id. at 597 (Benton, J., dissenting) (noting
that the legislature “has conferred on the State Board of
Education power to designate some of them—perhaps nearly
all of them—professionally ‘unsatisfactory,’ and therefore,
among other things, subject to being laid off, for reasons that
are so unclear and indefinite that the Legislature has
abandoned its responsibility to set public policy in this
important area, and delegated legislative authority it should
have exercised itself to the State Board of Education, an
executive branch agency.”)
171
172
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evaluation regulations requiring the use of VAMs.176
Numerous plaintiffs, including teachers’ unions, sought
to enjoin the use of VAMs on the grounds that the
regulations exceeded the power vested in the state
Department of Education.177 The case settled and the
state ultimately agreed to eliminate the required use of
VAMs in teacher evaluation regulations.178
In New Mexico ex rel Stewart v. New Mexico
Public Education Department, a group of plaintiffs
consisting of legislators, unions, and teachers filed a
complaint on the grounds that the state Department of
Education improperly infringed other state laws when it
promulgated its teacher evaluation regulations.179
Plaintiffs argued that the School Personnel Act provides
for the processes associated with teacher evaluation and
termination.180
Similarly, plaintiffs allege that the Department’s
regulation conflicts with New Mexico’s Public
Sean Collins Walsh, Union Sues to Block Texas Teacher
Evaluation Change, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, (Aug. 13. 2016),
https://www.statesman.com/news/20160813/union-sues-toblock-texas-teacher-evaluation-change [https://perma.cc/MQ
C2-FATW].
177 Id.
178 Melissa B. Taboada, Lawsuit Settled: Texas Teacher
Appraisals Won’t Be Tied to STAAR Scores, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN
(last
updated
Sept.
25,
2018),
https://www.statesman.com/news/20170504/lawsuit-settledtexas-teacher-appraisals-wont-be-tied-to-staar-scores
[https://perma.cc/XP3C-H2WB].
179 Complaint, State ex rel Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t,
No. D-101-CV-2015-00409 (N.M. 1st Jud. Dist. Feb. 13, 2015),
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/nm-complaintteacherevals_1114.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T99-FG89]. The
plaintiffs also claim substantive and procedural due process
violations.
180 See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-19(D) (2010) (providing
that evaluations should be determined in part by how well
professional development was carried out).
176
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Employment Bargaining Law (the state’s enabling
collective bargaining statute) that governs “the terms
and conditions of employment.”181 More specifically, that
law provides that local school districts must negotiate
terms and conditions of employment with the
representative union.182 The case is pending with various
motions before the court.183
C. Process & “Fundamental Fairness” Cases
1. Houston Federation of Teachers
A group of Houston teachers sought declaratory
and injunctive relief in the case of Houston Federation of
Teachers v. Houston Independent School District.184 At
issue for the court was the constitutional protections
afforded teachers in the instance where the Houston
public school districts used VAMs to rate and make
employment decisions for its teachers.185 The Houston
Independent School District (HISD) had contracted with
a third-party vendor who had created certain algorithms
to classify and rate teachers based on their students’ test
performance.186 This third party vendor, citing trade
secrecy, refused to reveal the algorithms when they were
requested for review by the teachers.187 Therefore,
teachers who faced adverse employment consequences
Complaint at 31, Stewart, No. D-101-CV-2015-00409.
See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17 (New Mexico’s
Public Employment Labor Relations Statute).
183 See Motion for Summary Judgment Filed in New Mexico
Teacher Evaluation Lawsuit, (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.
krwg.org/post/motion-summary-judgment-filed-new-mexicoteacher-evaluation-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/R8CU-DYHN].
184 Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
185 Id. at 1171.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1172.
181
182
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could not review the underlying formulas that
contributed to these decisions.188
The teachers claimed that the use of the value
added models constituted violation of the substantive and
procedural due process clauses of the Constitution.189
Repeating a line of reasoning in Cook v. Bennett, and
other cases, the federal district court ruled that the
district’s use of VAMs did not amount to a substantive
due process violation.190 The court concluded the
following: “Even accepting plaintiffs’ criticisms at face
value, the loose constitutional standard of rationality
allows governments to use blunt tools which may produce
only marginal results. HISD’s motion for summary
judgment on this substantive due process claim is
granted.”191
Yet the court found in favor of the plaintiffs’
procedural due process claims.192 The court’s analysis is
instructive because it relied heavily on procedural due
process as ensuring fundamental fairness.193 The court
wrote:
“[The] purpose of procedural due process is to
convey to the individual a feeling that the
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as
to minimize the risk of mistaken deprivations of
protected interests.” [] In short, due process is
designed to foster government decision-making
that is both fair and accurate.194

Id. at 1172–73.
Id.
190 Id. at 1181–82.
191 Id. at 1182.
192 Id. at 1180.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1176 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978)).
188
189
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The court then listed the factors required for procedural
due process to be satisfied in the case of a teacher
termination in Texas.195 Of particular note was that a
teacher facing termination must “be advised of the cause
for his termination in sufficient detail so as to enable him
to show any error that may exist.”196
Teachers contended—and the court agreed—that
they were not being afforded due process protections
because the school district violated the requirement that
afforded a teacher “sufficient detail” to show that there
may be an error in the government’s decision.197 Because
the district’s third party vendor would not release the
underlying formulas, teachers could not possibly assess
the accuracy of the district’s value-added rating.198
The court listed numerous potential errors that
could be revealed if inspection of the formulas was
permitted.199 As the court stated: “The [] score “might be
erroneously calculated for any number of reasons,
ranging from data-entry mistakes to glitches in the
computer code itself. . . . HISD has acknowledged that
mistakes can occur in calculating a teacher’s EVAAS
score . . . .”200 The court was troubled by the district’s
stipulation that it could not correct a single teacher’s
score, even if an error was found, because correcting one
score would alter the results of all other teachers.201
Id.
Id. The court also noted that a teacher facing termination
must be afforded: “the names and testimony of the witnesses
against him; [] a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own
defense within a reasonable time; [] and a hearing before a
tribunal that possesses some academic expertise and an
apparent impartiality toward the charges.” Id. (citing Ferguson
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
197 Id. at 1176–77 (citing Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 759
F.2d 1224, 1228 (5th Cir. 1985)).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1177.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1178.
195
196

[565]
137

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2

Indeed, it is worth recalling that value added
scores are comparative in nature, assessing one teacher
against others.202 This means that, if one teacher’s score
is adjusted for an error, it alters all others.203 The court
characterized the underlying foundation of the VAM
ratings as built upon a “house of cards.”204 Accordingly, it
denied the school district’s summary judgment claim
with respect to procedural due process.205
2. Washington Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Public
Schools
The collective bargaining forum has also been
another forum wherein teachers have successfully
appealed the use of VAMs in teacher evaluations. By way
of background, collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
provide for a process (grievance arbitration), to redress
violations of the contract. This arbitration process can be
important, especially when a contract calls for certain
specifications concerning how teacher evaluations can be
conducted. Indeed, districts’ decisions to non-renew or
terminate a teacher for performance have been called
into question because a district fails to follow
contractually mandated processes.206 With some limited

Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1177.
204 Id. at 1178.
205 Id. at 1180. To be sure, procedural due process claims made
in Wagner v. Haslam, see supra notes 121129 and
accompanying discussion, did not survive. However, at issue in
that case was whether the teachers' bonuses could be linked to
their VAM scores. Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 688
(M.D. Tenn. 2015). In that context, the court concluded that
bonuses were not a property interest sufficient to trigger due
process protections. Id. at 698.
206 See, e.g., Dennis Yarmouth Teachers v. Dennis Yarmouth
Reg’l Sch. Dist, 360 N.E.3d 883, 884–885 (1977) (reversing a
school district’s decision to non-renew a probationary teacher
202
203
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exceptions, scholarship has omitted consideration of the
value and importance of collective bargaining
agreements in relation to legal challenges to the use of
VAMs in teacher evaluations.207
Cases emerging from Washington, D.C., illustrate
this theme. In Washington, a teacher’s union grieved the
public district’s performance ratings based on VAMs of
hundreds of teachers. As an initial matter, the school
district challenged whether the issue could, in fact, be
subject to the grievance arbitration procedures in the
contract. Indeed, as a general matter, disputes are
subject to the grievance process only if both parties
agreed to arbitrate the dispute under the CBA.208
In Washington Teachers’ Union, a lower court had
concluded that the district’s final evaluation decisions
made under the evaluation systems were not arbitrable
but the district’s use of evaluation procedures under the
collective bargaining was, in fact, arbitrable.209 Put
another way, the parties did not, under the CBA, agree
to arbitrate disputes over the judgment of the teachers’
final performance, but they did agree to arbitrate
whether or not the evaluation procedures outlined were

because school district violated terms of the collective
bargaining agreement that specified evaluation processes).
207 But see PAIGE, supra note 9, at 63–73 (arguing the use of
VAMs is susceptible to the grievance arbitration process and
the failures of VAMs to accurately assess teacher effectiveness
could be remedied through the collective bargaining process.);
see also Mark A. Paige, Applying the Paradox Theory: A Law
and Policy Analysis of Collective Bargaining Rights and
Teacher Evaluation Reform From Selected States, 2013 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 21, 41–42 (highlighting the benefits of a more
collaborative collective bargaining process understood as
“interest-based” bargaining particularly with respect to
teacher evaluation).
208 Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Schs., 77 A.3d 441 (D.C.
Cir. 2013)
209 Id. at 444.
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followed.210 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals upheld the decision that the district’s final
judgments were not arbitrable. However, the school
district did not challenge the lower court’s determination
that the issue of whether the district followed evaluation
procedures was subject to evaluation.211
In at least one other well-publicized case, the
Washington Teachers’ Union succeeded in frustrating
the D.C. Public Schools use of the IMPACT evaluation
system.212 In this case, the union alleged that the school
district violated various evaluation procedures when they
terminated a seventeen year veteran teacher, Thomas
O’Rourke, under the district’s evaluation procedures.213
As noted above, the controlling courts in the District of
Columbia have concluded that “process arguments”
under the collective bargaining agreement are arbitrable,
although the school district’s final judgment with respect
to
evaluation
categorization
(e.g.,
ineffective,
satisfactory, etc.) is not.
In the District of Columbia Public Schools matter,
the arbitrator found that the district violated evaluation
procedures governing the length of observation visits,
which, according to the contract, should be “at least 30
minutes.”214 In this case, the administrators evaluating
the teacher exceeded that length by substantial amounts
(e.g., observations lasted 80 minutes), which, in the eyes
of the arbitrator, amounted to a procedural violation of
evaluation processes.215 Importantly, the arbitrator noted
Id.
Id.
212 D.C. Pub. Sch. v. Wash. Teachers Union, Local 6, AAA No.
16-20-1300-0499 AVH (Feigenbaum, Arb.); see also Perry
Stein, Teachers Union Touts Victory in Evaluation Fight WASH.
POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
education/wp/2016/04/05/teachers-union-touts-victory-inevaluation-fight/ [https://perma.cc/P7RU-PSP7].
213 D.C. Pub. Schs., AAA No. 16-20-1300-0499 AVH.
214 Id. at 26–28.
215 Id. at 18.
210
211
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two other significant factual findings to his decision. He
concluded that the administrator evaluating the teacher
had a reputation of using the observation system to
penalize teachers “he did not like.”216 A school district
administrator, as well, testified that an observation that
exceeded or did not meet the thirty minute threshold
would amount to a process violation.217 In sum, and under
these circumstances, therefore, procedural violations
could be seen as simply pretext for terminating a
teacher.218
In arbitration cases, the remedy for a bargaining
violation can be a contested issue. In Washington, D.C.,
an arbitrator cannot issue a remedy in the form of
recategorizing a teacher’s evaluation from ineffective to
effective.219 Reinstatement and back pay, however, are
typical arbitration remedies,220 and these were, in fact,
used in the case.
IV. Current Policy Landscape in Wake of ESSA
This section discusses the current policy
landscape following the reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 by
Congressional passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA) of 2015. It illustrates that the ESSA
reauthorization allowed for more state-level flexibility
with regards to VAM use. It then highlights how the new
policies have essentially shifted the emphasis from VAMs

Id. at 19.
Id. at 7.
218 Id. at 19.
219 Wash. Teachers’ Union v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 77 A.3d 441, 458
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
220 See e.g., DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION ch.
13.I.A. (Norman Brand & Melissa Birens, eds., 3d ed.) (noting
that back-pay and reinstatement are two essential remedies for
making an employee whole).
216
217
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in high stakes decision making to, perhaps, other ways of
measurement.
A. ESSA Reauthorization
In 2015, Congress passed a reauthorization of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act under a new
name, the Every Student Succeeds Act.221 In general,
ESSA reduced some federal mandates and incentives tied
to accountability system effectively limiting some of the
federal control promoted by RttT and other waiver
requirements.222 Specifically, ESSA allowed state
departments of education two main changes: (a) ESSA
gave state departments leniency to interpret key terms
like, “including, as a significant factor, data on student
growth for all students,” and (b) ESSA gave state
departments more control to determine state goals and
measures for success with a federal framework.223 Put
simply, ESSA allowed more flexibility.
To break down the policy changes further, the first
main change, allowing states to interpret “data on
student growth” differently, allowed state departments of
education to step back from the statistically-based
measures of student growth such as VAMs. ESSA
allowed states to use some measures which could include
qualitative measures as data showing student growth,
such as student learning objectives (SLOs), which are
objectives for the growth of students developed at the
beginning of the year by teachers (sometimes in
conjunction with others).224
SLOs still rely on evidence which can still include
VAM scores, but the evidence can also include course
Every Students Succeeds Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-95 §
114 Stat. 1177 (2015).
222 Race to the Top Act of 2011, S. Res. 844, 112th Cong. (2011).
223
ESEA
Flexibility,
U.S.
DEP’T
EDUC.
(2012),
https://www.ed.gov/esea/flexibility [https://perma.cc/95A7-FLFA].
224 CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 18.
221
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exams, performance demonstrations, and other types of
evidence. In short, ESSA allowed states to incorporate
more nuanced and qualitative measures of student
growth without removing the requirement that states
must use evidence of student growth. The distinction is
small but significant. It signals a redefinition of “data” to
include information beyond large standardized testing
(although, importantly, it can still include these test
scores).
The second main change, allowing states to set
their own goals and measures for success, marks a
backing away from the strict adequate yearly progress
(AYP) goals established by NCLB. Although states still
must meet AYP for certain subgroups of students, the
consequences and the interventions that must be
imposed can be decided by the states themselves.
Essentially, ESSA removes the punitive bite
demonstrated previously by NCLB, the bite that
encouraged many states to apply for waivers and adopt
VAMs in the first place, and replaces it with flexibility.
States choose their own bite now. The standards remain,
but the consequence, the type of intervention required for
a failure to meet AYP, is decided by state departments of
education.
These two changes, though small, rolled back
some of the features that encouraged, or forced, states to
use large standardized statewide systems that leaned on
VAM results to measure teacher achievement.225 The
new policy meant states did not need to create large-scale
comparable data about teacher achievement. States no
longer needed to structure their systems top-down and
could allow for more bottom-up control, essentially
handing more control to local educational authorities
such as school districts. ESSA marked a shift of power.
The federal government loosened reigns on state
Cindy Long, Six Ways ESSA Will Improve Assessments,
NEATODAY
(2016),
http://neatoday.org/2016/03/10/essaassessments/ [https://perma.cc/92AW-UC6A].
225
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departments of education, who, in turn, had the freedom
to deviate from establishing one-size-fits-all teacher
evaluation systems across their state, handing more of
the power to make decisions to local educational
authorities, such as districts.
B. State Plans
Though ESSA allowed for many of the changes
stated above, it did not require or guarantee these
changes. The work of exercising the flexibility was for the
states, not the federal government. Hence, this section on
state plans reveals how state teacher evaluation plans
changed as a whole after the passage of ESSA through
state legislative and regulatory action. The changes, as
expected, trend toward less use of VAMs in high-stakes
decision making, though the trend is somewhat muted.
In general, less states are currently using growth
models or VAMs for teacher evaluation. The percentage
dropped from 42% in 2014 to 30% in 2018.226 However,
that percentage drop fails to highlight the magnitude of
change. The study showing that the percentage
decreased measured whether some states currently use
or, importantly, endorse statewide use of VAMs. Some of
these states endorse VAMs but allow for local educational
authorities to avoid VAMs completely. For example,
Maine, encourages the use of VAMs, but offers two
models from which local education authorities can
choose, one of which measures student growth with
SLOs, not VAMs.227 In this case, VAMs play a role in the
state’s teacher evaluation process, but, ultimately, the
choice is made locally. This represents a major departure
from the trend of heavy-handed state teacher evaluation
systems before the passage of ESSA.
Additionally, some states have maintained their
VAMs but use them in novel ways. North Carolina still
226
227

CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 12.
Id. at 13.
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uses a VAM, called EVAAS, which featured heavily in
many of the lawsuits.228 However, the state does not use
the results to make high-stakes decisions. Rather, North
Carolina uses and reports the scores to foster
professional development.229 In other words, the state
does not shy from using VAM data as a part of their
system, but they do shy from using VAMs for
consequential decisions such as tenure decisions and
others.
Additionally, and of note, recent state plans
demonstrate increased focus on formative feedback
practices compared to state plans collected in 2012, with
31 of 51 education plans stating that their evaluation
systems use formative data.230 This shift indicates a
significant change in the stated values present in this
new set of state documents.
V. Conclusions
Quite apart from what education scholars and
policymakers believe with respect to the merits of added
models, all would likely agree that their introduction has
had significant consequences. Of course, there is
widespread disagreement with respect to how these
statistical models should be used. Teachers and unions
seeking to block the use of VAMs in high-stakes
employment decisions have sought judicial relief with
mixed success. That said, while courts may uphold the
use of VAMs under a rational basis test, they are suspect
about the wisdom of using VAMs to make significant
decisions with respect to teacher employment status.
But that does not mean that VAMs should be
relegated to the dustbin of educational policy history.
They may have important contributions to improving
teacher quality. They may be important “flags” for
See Hewitt, supra note 61, at 32.
CLOSE ET AL., supra note 35, at 14.
230 Id.
228
229
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teachers, alerting them to investigate their practice a bit
further. VAMs may, someday, play an important role in
helping teachers.
Importantly, however, the use of VAMs must be
judicious, especially in light of their severe limitations.
VAMs cannot tell a teacher what causes a particular
result (the type of robust and actionable feedback a
teacher would want) and they are highly sensitive to
demographics and variables outside of a teacher’s control.
Yet, because VAMs were incorporated in high-stakes
decisions with such haste, especially with the impetus of
the Race to the Top, they were brought to scale, warts
and all.
Thankfully, states have a rare opportunity in
educational policy to take a bit more control over their
destiny under the Every Student Succeeds Act. They
can—and are—placing VAMs as a piece of a puzzle to
solve teacher quality issues. Many are beginning to adopt
laws and policies that minimize or eliminate their use in
high-stakes employment. That is a step in the right
direction, one that recognizes a relative value to VAMs in
the larger quest to improve public education.
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